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This Article discusses the judicial status of religious
tribunals in the United States and Canada. The constitutions
of both countries provide for freedom of religion. The First
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
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thereof . . . .”1 North of the border, the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, part of the Canadian Constitution,
establishes the “fundamental freedom” of “conscience and
religion,” and states that no one may be discriminated
against on account of religion.2 The American and Canadian
constitutions differ in their treatment of the divine: the
U.S. Constitution is free of any reference to God,3 whereas the
Canadian Charter notes in its Preamble that “Canada is
founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God
and the rule of law.”4 Nevertheless, both countries have
secular judicial systems: divine involvement in the judicial
process appears to be limited to judges’ oaths.5
God and law do, however, intersect in both countries—in
the form of religious arbitration. Religious arbitration, for
the purposes of this Article, is defined as a voluntary
dispute resolution process, conducted according to religious

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 113 Side A
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, §§ 2, 15 (U.K.)
[hereinafter Charter].
3. Article VI explicitly prevents the United States from employing a
religious test for office. U.S. CONST. art. VI (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States.”). The only direct reference to God in the U.S. Constitution is found at
the very end, in the Attestation Clause: “Done in Convention by the Unanimous
Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of
our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the
Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth.” For a discussion of
the “Sunday exception” in Article II, see Jaynie Randall, Sundays Excepted, 59
ALA. L. REV. 507 (2008) (arguing that the “Sunday exception” did not reflect a
view of the United States as a Christian nation, but rather that it was designed
to accommodate different state approaches to Sabbath observance).
4. Charter, supra note 2, at pmbl.
5. For the federal judicial oath in the United States, see 28 U.S.C. § 453
(2006). The oath that must be sworn is: “I, __, do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to
the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and
perform all the duties incumbent upon me as __ under the Constitution and
laws of the United States. So help me God.” Id. The invocation “so help me
God” is a standard formula, also found in the oaths taken by federal legislators
and officers. See 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006). The U.S. Supreme Court famously
opens its sessions with the invocation “God Save the United States and this
Honorable Court.” See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446 (1962) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). “So help me God” is found also in Canadian judicial oaths. See,
e.g., Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, § 10 (Can.) (stipulating oath of
office for supreme court justices in Canada).
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6. Arbitration has many possible definitions. It can refer to processes that
are binding, or non-binding; to actions that are highly formal, or highly
informal; and to processes that are intended to serve as a prelude to court
action, a partial substitute for court action, or a complete substitute. NAT’L
INST. OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PATHS TO JUSTICE: MAJOR PUBLIC POLICY
ISSUES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION app. 2 (1983). For example, “court-annexed”
arbitration is a form of arbitration widely used in administrative law, whereby
civil suits are first referred to arbitrators who render non-binding decisions;
these decisions can be reviewed by the courts later, if required. Id. at 36.
7. Id.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.B.
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principles.6 Such arbitration often serves as a substitute for
proceedings in civil court.7 At present, in the United States,
agreements to arbitrate a dispute before a religious tribunal
are generally enforceable in civil courts, as are awards
made by religious arbitral tribunals.8 In Canada, religious
arbitration agreements and awards are also usually
enforceable in courts, with the exception of family disputes in
the provinces of Ontario and Québec.9
This Article questions this approach. It argues that
holding religious arbitration agreements and awards binding
in cases where civil courts are able to handle the dispute
poses problems for religious freedom. Constitutional law in
the United States and Canada points towards holding such
agreements and awards unenforceable. At the same time,
this Article recognizes that certain types of agreements can
only be settled by religious tribunals; in these cases, religious
arbitration promotes, rather than hinders, religious freedom.
Part I of this Article traces religious dispute resolution to
its origins in England and France, before looking at how it
was received in colonial America, the early United States,
and Canada. Part II looks at the current status of religious
arbitration in the United States and Canada, and discusses
questions about its enforceability.
Part III examines
arguments that have traditionally been made against
religious arbitration, and demonstrates why these arguments
do not prove that enforceable religious arbitral agreements
and awards are troublesome from a constitutional
perspective. Part III then considers the question raised by
this Article against the judicial enforcement of religious
arbitration awards and agreements: that it violates parties’
right to freedom of religion. It argues that the enforcement of
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agreements and awards stemming from entirely secular
disputes is constitutionally problematic. Part IV considers
responses that may be made to the arguments in Part III.
I.

HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION

A. Religious Modes of Dispute Resolution in England and
France

04/16/2012 17:10:32

10. HENRICUS DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE, Bk
1:8 (photo. reprint 2009) (London, Flesher & Young, 1640).
11. Id.
12. JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 313–14 (2009).
13. PHILIPPE SUEUR, 2 HISTOIRE DU DROIT PUBLIC FRANÇAIS 477–78 (1989).
14. Id. at 476 (“One faith, one law, one king.”).
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God and law were intertwined in medieval Europe. The
English legal textbook known as Bracton, written about 1230,
stated that there could be no king “where will rules, rather
than law,” and that the king was the “vicar of God” and
therefore answerable to Him.10 Bracton summed up the
whole thus: “The king should not be beneath man but
beneath God and the law.”11 Divine and secular law were
not always easily distinguishable. In 1489, the English
Chancellor, ruling in a trust dispute, held that “each Law is,
or ought to be, in accordance with the Law of God.”12 For
much of English history, church and state were mixed, and
law was infused with religious principles.
A similar situation existed in France. Although France
had known no English-style Reformation, it moved toward
greater state control of religion in the seventeenth century:
the Déclaration du Clergé de France (1682) established
Gallicanism in France and the revocation of the Edict of
Nantes followed three years later, expelling Protestants.13
Through the king, religion and law were inextricably linked:
une foi, une loi, un roi.14
Even though law and religion were interconnected, it is
possible to trace the origins of religious arbitration back to
pre-modern England and France. The English and French
religious authorities frequently provided routes to justice that
were an alternative to the state courts. Unlike modern
arbitration, the religious courts exercised compulsory
jurisdiction; however, they are like modern religious arbitral
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tribunals to some extent, in that they competed directly with
civil courts.
1. England
Church law can be seen as an early forerunner of
religious arbitration in England. By the fourteenth century,
the church courts had adopted the practice of hearing appeals
from the common-law courts, and the monarch was obliged
to enact a statute to prevent it.15 Up to the eve of the
Reformation, the church still exercised jurisdiction over what
we would today regard as quintessentially secular contract
law.16 Although this business disappeared, the church courts
retained active dockets: the sixteenth and seventeenth
century church courts heard matrimonial, probate, tithe,
and defamation cases.17 Whereas the first category was
comparatively rare,18 the second category grew increasingly
important as a greater and greater proportion of the
population made wills.19 Between the mid-sixteenth and midseventeenth centuries, slander cases exploded in the church
courts,20 and the population as a whole had to pay tithes,
which were a constant source of litigation.21 Although the

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 114 Side B
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15. First Statute of Praemunire, 27 Edw. 3, stat. 1, c. 1 (1353). The statute
noted that “the judgments rendered in the [king’s] court are being impeached in
the court of another, to the prejudice and disherison of our lord the king.”
LANGBEIN, supra note 12, at 331. It provided that anyone who sought to annul
a common law verdict by travelling to Rome would have to appear before the
king’s council to justify his actions. See id. at 331–32. It was strengthened by
the Second (Great) Statute of Praemunire of 1393, which stated that the
ecclesiastics had to enforce the judgments of the king’s courts, and also provided
that anyone who purchased a legal instrument from Rome that was “inimical to
the [king], his crown, his regality, or his aforesaid kingdom” was to be outlawed.
16 Rich. 2, c. 5 (1393). See W.T. Waugh, The Great Statute of Praemunire, 37
ENG. HIST. REV. 173 (1922).
16. R.B. OUTHWAITE, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ENGLISH ECCLESIASTICAL
COURTS 1500-1860, at 15 (2006). The church exercised its jurisdiction through
the doctrine of fidei laesio, or breach of faith. Id. at 15–16. A litigant could
claim ecclesiastical jurisdiction over a contract dispute by alleging not that his
counterparty had failed to perform, but that he had breached his oath to
perform. Id. These suits disappeared in the sixteenth century as the common
law courts found ways of exercising jurisdiction over these disputes. Id. at 19–
20; see also LANGBEIN, supra note 12, at 131–32.
17. OUTHWAITE, supra note 16, at 20.
18. Id. at 51.
19. Id. at 33–39.
20. Id. at 41.
21. Id. at 23–24.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 115 Side A

04/16/2012 17:10:32

4_WALTER FINAL.DOC

2012]

3/15/2012 4:16:34 PM

RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION

507

church courts were dealt a heavy blow to their jurisdiction in
the English Revolution,22 they survived with jurisdiction over
matrimonial and probate disputes until 1857, when they
finally surrendered control over all that is now considered
“secular.”23
Not all of this can be considered “arbitration” in the sense
defined earlier. In the case of probate disputes before 1857,
for example, only the church courts had jurisdiction over
grants of probate.24 However, in various instances—for
example, contract disputes—the church courts were in direct
competition with the royal courts.25
2. France
France became a centralized nation-state later than
England,26 but nevertheless demonstrates the same pattern
by which church courts competed with royal courts, and
gradually lost influence to them. By the thirteenth century,
jurisdiction in France was shared between a wide variety of
courts—royal,
seigneurial,
ecclesiastical,
municipal.27
Medieval ecclesiastical justice was administered via
officialités, organized by the bishop of each diocese.28 These
officialités heard cases where they could exercise either
personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction.29
Personal jurisdiction could be established if a party was
either a regular or secular clerk.30 The church’s jurisdiction
extended to both civil and criminal cases: in the latter cases,
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 115 Side A
04/16/2012 17:10:32

22. Id. at 78.
23. LANGBEIN, supra note 12, at 355.
24. 12 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 605–06, 686–89
(3d reprt. 1977).
25. Id. at 131 (“The willingness of the church courts to take jurisdiction in
cases involving oaths led to a quasi-arbitral jurisdiction in contract matters.”).
26. The French royal writ in the eleventh and twelfth centuries hardly ran
beyond the central domain of Ile-de-France. See ALBERT RIGAUDIERE, HISTOIRE
DU DROIT ET DES INSTITUTIONS DANS LA FRANCE MEDIEVALE ET MODERNE 245
(4th ed. 2010). From the end of the twelfth century to the end of the fifteenth
century, royal power reasserted itself. Id. at 309. By contrast, England became
a centralized nation-state much earlier. See generally R. C. VAN CAENEGEM,
THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 85–110 (2d ed. 1988) (comparing
early rise of English legal system with later development in France and on the
European continent).
27. RIGAUDIERE, supra note 26, at 350.
28. Id. at 356.
29. Id. at 357–58.
30. Id. at 357.
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the church could inflict any punishment known to the civil
courts, with the exception of death.31 The church claimed
subject matter jurisdiction over matters of faith, such as
heresy and blasphemy; it also dealt with family law and
marriage, and claimed a wide jurisdiction over disputes that
had a “mixed” religious and secular character, such as
contracts made under oath.32 Any “grave transgression”
against public morality could be tried in church court.33
The church courts reached the zenith of their power in
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.34 The royal courts
sought to squeeze out this ecclesiastical competition. From
the fourteenth century onwards, royal courts established
jurisdiction over cases involving church officials that involved
They also
serious crimes against the public order.35
established appellate jurisdiction over the church courts in
cases where the church courts overstepped the bounds of
their jurisdiction; in the fifteenth century, this became
a general appellate jurisdiction.36 In 1539, ecclesiastical
jurisdiction was dramatically curtailed by François I with the
Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts, which provided that
ecclesiastical judges could not hear “actions pures
personelles,” and left them with competence only over “purely
religious matters.”37 In 1695, such ecclesiastical jurisdiction
was placed under royal supervision by Louis XIV.38

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 115 Side B
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31. Id. at 358. “It was a principle of the Canon law that the Church could
not shed blood . . . .” A. ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRANCE 50 (photo. reprint 2000)
(John Simpson trans., 4th ed. 1913). However, being tried in a Church court
would not necessarily save a wrongdoer’s life: if it was felt that the death
penalty was merited, the Church would hand over the guilty individual to the
secular authorities for execution. Id.
32. RIGAUDIERE, supra note 26, at 359.
33. Id.
34. BRIGITTE BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & JEAN GAUDEMET, INTRODUCTION
HISTORIQUE AU DROIT XIIIE-XXE SIECLES 175 (2000).
35. RIGAUDIERE, supra note 26, at 360.
36. Id. at 361.
37. See Ordonnance d’Août 1539 Prise par le Roi François I,
ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/villerscotterets.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2011); see also BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET, supra
note 34, at 176 (noting that François I had “reduced in six lines [of statute]
ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the very limit of reason” (author trans., quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
38. BASDEVANT–GAUDEMET, supra note 34, at 176.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 116 Side A

04/16/2012 17:10:32

4_WALTER FINAL.DOC

2012]

3/15/2012 4:16:34 PM

RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION

509

As in England, there were not always civil alternatives to
church dispute resolution. However, the church directly
This
competed with secular courts in some areas.39
competition between state- and church-sponsored dispute
resolution was found also among the English and French
settlers in North America, which is the subject of the next
section.
B. Religious Arbitration in North America

04/16/2012 17:10:32

39. RIGAUDIERE, supra note 26, at 359 (“All areas of law [other than
religious law, marriage law, and law concerning church property] were subject
to a concurrent jurisdiction. It often gave rise to a lively competition and offered
a true choice to the litigant.” (author trans.)).
40. See RELIGION AND THE NEW REPUBLIC: FAITH IN THE FOUNDING OF
AMERICA 189–90 (James H. Hutson ed., 2000).
41. 1 Stat. 97 (1789).
42. RELIGION AND THE NEW REPUBLIC, supra note 40, at 196.
43. Id. at 75.
44. ROBERT CHOQUETTE, CANADA’S RELIGIONS: AN HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION 141 (2004).
45. Id. at 163.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 116 Side A

The relationship between church and state was very
different in colonial and post-colonial North America from the
relationship seen in England and France.
In colonial
America, various colonies had established churches.40 In
1789 the First Congress of the United States proposed to the
states the First Amendment, which prevented an established
church from reaching the same position in national American
life as it had in Britain.41
State established churches
continued in existence until 1833, at which point
Massachusetts repealed its church taxes and there was no
longer any established church in the country.42
North of the border in Canada, a different state of affairs
prevailed. If British emigration to the New World was driven
by religious dissenters, French emigration was decidedly
conformist: in 1629, an edict was passed stating that only
Roman Catholics could settle in “New France.”43 In the mideighteenth century, the bishop of Québec “was in effect an
officer of the [French] crown.”44 The British colonies in
Canada also created bonds between church and state. Nova
Scotia, conquered by Britain in 1710, established the Church
of England in 1758.45 The Quebec Act of 1774 granted
tolerance to Catholics in the province, but Anglicanism was
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established as the province’s religion shortly afterwards.46 By
1800 all of Canada’s provinces or territories favored the
Church of England, either officially or unofficially.47 The
Church was however swiftly disestablished: by the early
nineteenth century in the maritime provinces, and by 1854, in
the rest of the country.48
Despite this fluctuating relationship between church and
state, religious arbitration flourished in colonial and early
independent North America. The next sections describe some
of the religious arbitration processes employed by the
European settlers. The descriptions are indicative, and do
not present a comprehensive account of religious arbitration
in North America in this period: as one scholar has written,
“[t]he shadowy and unsystematic documentary record of
[these] processes poses particular challenges for those
wishing to study them.”49 However, they demonstrate that
religious arbitration in North America is not simply a modern
phenomenon.
1. Religious Arbitration in Colonial British America

04/16/2012 17:10:32

46. Id. at 165.
47. Id. at 205.
48. Id. at 222.
49. Philip Girard, Taking Litigation Seriously: The Market Wharf
Controversy at Halifax, 1785–1820, in 8 ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN
LAW: IN HONOUR OF R.C.B. RISK 213, 235 n.3 (G. Blaine Baker & Jim Phillips
eds., 1981).
50. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 22 (1983).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 23.
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The functioning of religious arbitration in colonial
America can be seen particularly clearly in Massachusetts.
Church was at the center of life for the Puritans, and their
church courts had powers that outstripped their English
counterparts. Civil and religious justice were thoroughly
mixed. Even criminal cases could end up in a church court,50
whereas the civil courts exercised jurisdiction over offenses
that were purely religious—such as failure to attend church.51
Churches often functioned as the only available courts.52
However, we see from an early time what can be described as
“arbitration.” The Massachusetts colony encouraged the
settlement of disputes outside of the “legal” framework. A
Boston town in 1635 laid down an ordinance that no
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congregation members could litigate unless there had been a
prior effort at arbitration.53 A case from 1640 describes
arbitration between a prominent lady and a carpenter.54 The
church sponsored arbitration—twice—which the lady refused
to abide by.55 The dispute then went into a church, which
enforced it: not by seizing her property, which it could not
do,56 but by excommunicating her.57
Church courts in Massachusetts could only exercise
jurisdiction in disputes where the parties were of the same
congregation.58 However, these courts could have certain
advantages. Churches met all year round; the civil courts of
first instance, on the other hand, sat only four times a year,
and in the county seat.59 Furthermore, the church was less
formal, and there was no need to go to the expense of hiring a
lawyer.60 Religious arbitration was also divinely sanctioned:
St. Paul exhorted the believers to settle disputes among
themselves, urging them not to take cases to the courts of the
“unbelievers.”61 The civil courts functioned as a “back-up”
when the civil power was needed—for example, to arrest
persons and attach property.62 The parallel jurisdiction of the
civil and church courts is a feature of modern-day arbitration,
and it is not surprising that the other characteristics that we
often associate with modern arbitration—speed, informality
and inexpensiveness—were present in religious arbitration
before American independence.
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 117 Side A
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53. Id.
54. Id. at 23–24.
55. Id. at 23.
56. Even in the theocracy that was seventeenth-century Massachusetts,
there was a divide between civil judicial power and the church.
The
Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 stated that “[c]ivill Authoritie hath
power and libertie to deale with any Church member in a way of Civill Justice,
notwithstanding any Church relation, office, or interest,” and churches could
not interfere with civil offices. However, any church had the “libertie to deale
with any of their members in a church way that are in the hand of Justice.” See
WILLIAM H. WHITMORE, A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE LAWS OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS COLONY FROM 1630 TO 1686, at 47–57 (photo. reprint 2006)
(Boston 1890).
57. AUERBACH, supra note 50, at 23–24.
58. WILLIAM E. NELSON, DISPUTE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN PLYMOUTH
COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS, 1725–1825, at 43 (1981).
59. Id. at 44.
60. Id.
61. 1 Corinthians 6:6.
62. NELSON, supra note 58, at 44.
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2. Religious Arbitration in the Early United States

04/16/2012 17:10:32

63. Id. at 76.
64. Id. at 147.
65. NELSON, supra note 58, at 198 n.62.
66. AUERBACH, supra note 50, at 51.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 54.
69. C. Paul Dredge, Dispute Settlement in the Mormon Community: The
Operation of Ecclesiastical Courts in Utah, in 4 ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 191, 198 (Klaus-Friedrich Koch ed., 1979).
70. Id.
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The success of colonial-era religious arbitration did not
survive into the post-Revolutionary era. By the early years of
the nineteenth century, the courts had effectively become “the
only institution that was available to adjudicate a dispute.”63
The ultimate sanction of the church courts was
excommunication, which increasingly lost its bite. It was no
longer nearly as common in the nineteenth century for every
member of a community to attend the same Congregationalist
church.64 Isolated instances remained: for example, a church
in Middleboro, Massachusetts in 1826 handled a dispute
between two members concerning a dam.65 But religious
arbitration could not compete with the secular system
without adopting a secular enforcement mechanism.
Outside of New England, religious arbitration survived
among various groups during the nineteenth century. The
Utopian Christian communities sought to internalize their
disputes and avoid the courts. John Humphrey Noyes wrote
that the Oneida community in New York, a society of
Christian Perfectionists, was “very averse to litigation and
intended . . . to preclude the possibility of it.”66 A Christian
Utopian community made up of German immigrants in
Aurora, Oregon, allegedly went nineteen years without
recourse to the courts.67
The most successful Utopian community by far was the
The Mormons shunned
Mormons in Utah territory.68
“gentile” justice and lawyers.69 Brigham Young summed up
their views in 1857: “There is not a righteous person, in this
community, who will have difficulties that cannot be settled
by arbitrators . . . .”70 He argued that civil courts wasted time
and “destroyed the best interests of the community,”
colorfully adding that courts were a “kitchen of the devil,
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71. Id. at 199.
72. TODD M. KERSTETTER, GOD’S COUNTRY, UNCLE SAM’S LAND: FAITH AND
CONFLICT IN THE AMERICAN WEST 40 (2006). The Saints intended to “abandon
the United States to found Zion outside its borders.” Id.
73. Dredge, supra note 69, at 198.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 194.
76. Id. at 198. This was often easy: lower courts in the Territory were
controlled by Mormons, who would allow litigants to choose what mode of
adjudication they wanted. Id.
77. Id. at 214.
78. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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prepared for hell” and that lawyers were a “stink in the
nostrils” of every Latter-Day Saint.71 However, despite the
Mormon migration to an area of the West that was largely
unpopulated—and so where they might be able to form a
community in peace72—they still had to compete with civil
justice.73 Utah was incorporated as a territory in 1850, four
years after the Latter-Day Saints traveled to the region, and
with territorial status came federal judges.74
The Mormons had never sought complete judicial
autonomy: following a revelation, Joseph Smith had
established in 1831 that crimes such as murder and robbery
were to be tried in civil courts by the “law of the land.”75 But
even after federal judges began administering justice in the
territory, the Mormon community generally preferred
to deal with intra-community disputes themselves.76 What
eventually weakened the strength of the Mormon
ecclesiastical justice system was not the pressures of civil
justice or the federal government; it was the growth of
religious diversity. Like all other religious arbitral tribunals,
the Mormons could only claim jurisdiction by consent of the
parties, and as the territory (and later state) became more
religiously diverse, the power of the religious courts
weakened.77
All of the Christian communities mentioned above felt
that they were obeying St. Paul’s commandment to
settle disputes among themselves.78 But other religious
communities too preferred to avoid the secular courts. The
Jewish population had historically retained dispute
resolution within their communities: this tradition dates to
the second century, when the Roman administration in
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In Europe,
Palestine abolished official Jewish courts.79
Jewish communities had adopted Batei Din to avoid their
disabilities in civic life, which sometimes prevented them
even from testifying in court;80 yet in any case, there was a
general prohibition against settling disputes in gentile
courts.81 Shortly after the turn of the twentieth century, the
New York Jewish community adopted a mode of arbitration
under the auspices of the Kehillah, a newly-created
community organization.82 Kehillah tribunals settled both
commercial and non-commercial disputes.83 Although they
faded after World War I, other arbitral tribunals arose to take
their place. The Jewish Arbitration Court was created in
1929; within a year, it had a rival, the Jewish Conciliation
Court of America.84 In New York, Jewish tribunals were
given a lease of life by the passage of the Municipal Court Act
of 1915, which made their judgments legally binding.85
Similar measures were adopted elsewhere: for example,
Maryland courts enforced judgments from tribunals where
both parties had agreed to be bound, which made it possible
for a Jewish tribunal to begin operating there in 1912.86
3. Religious Arbitration in Colonial Canada
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79. AUERBACH, supra note 50, at 77.
80. Id.
81. This prohibition remains, according to some scholars. 1 EMANUEL
QUINT, A RESTATEMENT OF RABBINIC CIVIL LAW 174 (1990).
82. AUERBACH, supra note 50, at 79.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 83–84.
85. Id. at 160 n.20.
86. B.H. Hartogensis, A Successful Community Court, 12 J. AM. JUD. SOC.
183, 183 (1929).
87. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
88. MARC DURAND, HISTOIRE DU QUEBEC 17 (1999).
89. JOHN DICKINSON & BRIAN YOUNG, A SHORT HISTORY OF QUEBEC 37 (4th
ed. 2008) (observing that Québec was regulated by the Custom of Paris, which
was “influenced by a religious and state ideology”).
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Religion permeated colonial Canadian society just as it
did in America. As noted above, it was established in 1629
that only Catholics could emigrate to New France.87
Protestants were banished in the 1640s,88 and colonial
legislation was heavily influenced by the state Catholicism.89
Québécois courts were modeled on the French system, and
the Church courts exercised a jurisdiction in Québec similar
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to that which they retained in France.90 As a result, there
was little overlap between the church and state system.
However, religious diversity increased as Protestant
denominations made themselves at home in other parts of
British North America and, following the Treaty of Paris of
1763, in New France itself. These communities sought to
resolve disputes among themselves, particularly in frontier
territories where lawyers were too expensive or courts too
distant.91
Anglophone Baptists in Nova Scotia in the nineteenth
century held that “Bretheren in christ [sic] . . . ought not to go
to law with one another; but all their Differences ought to be
Decided by the Brethren.”92
Quakers were opposed to
testifying on oath, and thus were generally prevented from
suing in state courts; they set up alternative processes of
mediation for their disputes.93 The Mennonites, for their
part, had emerged in Europe as the “most separated
brethren” of the Protestant Reformation and sought to retain
their way of life and culture in Canada.94 They were
frequently in conflict with secular laws,95 and Mennonite
churches would exercise a disciplinary function among their
members (and even non-members).96
Following the British conquest, Catholics also preferred
to resolve disputes among themselves: Acadians in New
Brunswick in the early nineteenth century, linguistically and
geographically isolated, often chose to put their disputes to
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90. CHARLES LINDSEY, ROME IN CANADA: THE ULTRAMONTANE STRUGGLE
SUPREMACY OVER THE CIVIL AUTHORITY 78 (Toronto, Lovells Bros. 1877)
(noting that “the Gallican liberties were introduced into Canada by France,”
although reserving the question of whether the “whole body of the droit
gallican” was in force in New France).
91. See, e.g., D.G. Bell, Maritime Legal Institutions Under the Ancien
Régime 1710–1850, 23 MANITOBA L.J. 103, 115–16 (1995) (noting that “much
emphasis was placed on resolving quarrels privately,” because of the costs of the
legal system); FRANK H. EPP, MENNONITES IN CANADA, 1786-1920, at 113 (1974)
(“The importance of the clergyman and the church congregation as keepers of
the peace . . . on the frontiers of Upper Canada [can be] inferred.”).
92. Bell, supra note 91, at 116.
93. Albert Schrauwers, The Politics of Schism: The Separation of the
Children of Peace, 1812, in FAITH, FRIENDS AND FRAGMENTATION: ESSAYS ON
NINETEENTH CENTURY QUAKERISM IN CANADA 69, 71–72 (Albert Schrauwers
ed., 1995).
94. EPP, supra note 91, at 23, 54.
95. Id. at 114.
96. Id. at 127.
FOR
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a local Catholic priest rather than deal with the
secular courts.97 There was in fact no Acadian lawyer from
New Brunswick until 1870.98 Unsurprisingly, early Jewish
communities adopted their own dispute resolution
procedures: the elders of the original Sephardic congregation
in Montréal constituted a kind of Beth Din which could
command any member of the community to appear before
them, and impose penalties for any misdemeanor.99 This
form of arbitration was no doubt made more appealing by the
fact that Jews labored under civil disabilities until the 1830s,
and were blocked from participating in public life by the need
to swear on explicitly Christian oaths.100
As the above discussion shows, religious arbitration in
North America is nothing new. The next Part discusses
religious arbitration in modern-day United States and
Canada.
II. RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION TODAY IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA
A. United States
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97. See D.G. Bell, A Perspective on Legal Pluralism in 19th-Century New
Brunswick, 37 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 86 (1988).
98. Id. at 89.
99. BENJAMIN G. SACK, HISTORY OF THE JEWS IN CANADA 52–53 (Ralph
Novek trans., 1965).
100. GERALD TULCHINSKY, CANADA’S JEWS: A PEOPLE’S JOURNEY 27–29
(2008).
101. See infra Part II.A.1.
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This section discusses religious arbitration in the United
States. The first subsection examines the framework in
which religious arbitration is conducted today. The following
subsections describe the operation of religious arbitration in
the United States and the obstacles to binding religious
arbitration.
It should be observed from the outset that there are no
remarkable differences between the states in their
enforcement of religious arbitral awards. This is because of
the dominance of the Federal Arbitration Act and the
Uniform Arbitration Act in this area.101 This situation may
change, however: Oklahoma in 2010 amended its constitution
to prevent judges from considering sharia law in their
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decisions.102 This provision, which was made the subject of a
preliminary injunction by a federal judge, would have the
effect of making judgments by Islamic tribunals
unenforceable.103 Other states are considering similar bans
on use of religious law.104 For the purposes of arbitration,
however, the states will be considered as a unitary whole.
1. Framework of Religious Arbitration
Arbitration in the United States today is governed
largely by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the Uniform
Arbitration Act (UAA). The FAA was enacted in 1925 and
was the fruit of lobbying to make arbitration clauses in
contracts enforceable.105 Arbitration is encouraged at the
federal level. In 1983, the Court declared that there was a
federal policy “favoring” the enforceability of arbitration
agreements;106 this decision was followed the next year by
Southland Corp. v. Keating, in which the Court reiterated the
“national policy favoring arbitration”107 and held that the
FAA, which was enacted under Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers,108 governed commercial contracts that were executed
under state law.109 This ruling had the effect of preempting
state laws restricting the enforceability of agreements to
arbitrate in commercial disputes.110
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102. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
103. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298; see also Michael A. Helfand, Oklahoma
Panics over Islamic Law, STAR TRIBUNE, Nov. 14, 2010, at A5, available at
http://www.startribune.com/opinion/commentary/107585918.html. The Tenth
Circuit recently heard oral arguments in an appeal against the preliminary
injunction. Robyn Hagan Cain, Tenth Circuit to Hear Arguments in Anti-Sharia
Law Case, FINDLAW: U.S. TENTH CIRCUIT (Sept. 12, 2011, 3:05 PM),
http://blogs.findlaw.com/tenth_circuit/2011/09/tenth-circuit-to-hear-argumentsin-anti-sharia-law-case.html.
104. Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New
Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231,
1239 (2011); Donna Leinwand, States Enter Debate on Sharia Law, U.S.A.
TODAY, Dec. 9, 2010, at 3A.
105. Margaret M. Harding, The Clash Between Federal and State Arbitration
Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Process, 77
NEB. L. REV. 397, 430 (1998). Up to this point, agreements to arbitrate were not
enforceable at common law. Id. at 431.
106. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
107. 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
108. Id. at 11.
109. Id. at 16.
110. See Harding, supra note 105, at 468–69.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 120 Side B

04/16/2012 17:10:32

4_WALTER FINAL.DOC

518

4/15/2012 9:57:30 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

04/16/2012 17:10:32

111. Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Modernizing,
Revising and Clarifying Arbitration Law, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 1 (2001).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (“The intent of the UAA to overcome courts’ adverse common-law
attitudes has been accomplished.”).
115. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 26, 7 U.L.A. 77–78 (2000).
116. Id. at §§ 12–13.
117. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Crumbled Difference Between
Legal and Illegal Arbitration Awards: Hall Street Associates and the Waning
Public Policy Exception, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 597 (2009). But see Hall
St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (holding that the
“manifest disregard for the law” standard may be encapsulated within section
10 of the FAA, which provides statutory grounds for overturning of arbitral
awards).
118. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (citation omitted).
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The Uniform Arbitration Act, for its part, was
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1955.111 It has been adopted by thirtyfive jurisdictions, and another fourteen have substantially
similar legislation.112 At the time of its promulgation, state
law was often hostile to arbitration agreements.113 This has
largely been changed, and under the UAA courts now
generally enforce arbitral awards.114 Under the UAA, a court
may overturn an award for procedural defects, such as bias or
lack of notice to the parties.115 It may also vacate an award if
the arbitrators have overstepped their powers and may
“correct an award” where there has been an “evident
mistake.”116
Neither the FAA nor the UAA provide that courts may
overturn awards that disregard constitutional rights—for
example, the right to be free of sexual discrimination.
However, courts may vacate awards given under federal or
state law on the grounds that they violate “public policy” or
show “manifest disregard for the law.”117 This enables courts
to vacate awards that clash with certain federal or state
constitutional rights.
Agreements to arbitrate, as distinct from arbitration
awards, can also only be overturned by courts in limited
circumstances. In Perry v. Thomas, the Court stated that
“[a]n agreement to arbitrate is valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, as a matter of federal law, ‘save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.’ ” 118 All arbitration agreements prima facie breach
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the right to a jury trial enshrined in the Seventh
Amendment:119 as a result, courts have held that this right
can be waived when a party “knowingly and intelligently”
enters into an arbitration agreement.120
In Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Court held that civil
rights claims can be subjected to compulsory arbitration.121
Because of the federal policy in favor of arbitration, some
state courts have adopted unconscionability doctrine as a way
of rendering arbitration agreements unenforceable.122
However, unconscionability is “generally a loser of an
argument,” and arbitration agreements are typically
enforced.123
2. Description of Religious Arbitration
Christian arbitration still exists in the United States,
although it has attracted less media attention than religious
The largest Christian
tribunals of other religions.124
arbitration service in the United States is Peacemaker
Ministries.125 Through its affiliate, the Institute for Christian
Conciliation, it offers non-binding conciliation and mediation
services, and—if those fail—legally binding arbitration
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119. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (providing that “[i]n Suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved”).
120. Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a
Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 24–25 (2003).
121. 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
122. See Aaron-Andew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic
Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420
(2008).
123. Id. at 1442. For a recent defeat of an unconscionability argument in the
Supreme Court, see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
124. This may be because there has been an assumption that Christian
principles have influenced the secular legal system, and so explicitly “Christian”
arbitration need not be radically different from civil justice. In 1892, for
example, Justice Brewer averred that the United States “is a Christian nation.”
Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
Justice Brewer was a committed Christian. See EDWARD A. PURCELL JR.,
BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER,
AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
46 (2000). He affirmed his views, qualifying them only slightly, in his later
tract, The United States: A Christian Nation (1905). See Daniel L. Dreisbach,
The United States: A Christian Nation, 39 J. CHURCH & ST. 607 (1997) (book
review).
125. R. Seth Shippee, Peacemaking: Applying Faith to Conflict Resolution, 10
DISP. RESOL. MAG. 3, 4 (2004).
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services.126 Any one of these may involve the use of Biblical
scripture as a guide to decision-making;127 the professed aim
of the religious procedure is to “glorify God by helping people
to resolve disputes,” and its rules of arbitration are
interpreted in accordance with this mission.128 Peacemaker
Ministries conducts about 100 “conciliations” each year,
which include mediations, arbitrations, and church
It also certifies about 150 conciliators
interventions.129
around the country, who each perform conciliations.130 Some
of these dispute resolutions might otherwise end up in the
secular court system.
Islamic dispute resolution services are also available,
and may take the form of either mediation or arbitration.131
Although mediation is more informal, courts may be more
likely to enforce an agreement arrived at through mediation,
since arbitrated agreements are sometimes seen as
incompatible with local laws;132 it has been reported that even
mediated awards often fail of enforcement.133 As indicated
above, the Batei Din continue their role in society. One such
organization, Beth Din of America, was founded in 1960 and
offers resolution of both commercial and family disputes.134
Like the Institute for Christian Conciliation, it gives those
using its services the option of binding arbitration.135 The
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126. Rules of Procedure, INST. OF CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION, http://www.peace
maker.net/site/c.nuIWL7MOJtE/b.5378801/k.D71A/Rules_of_Procedure.htm
(last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
127. For example, the rules of procedure state that “arbitrators may request
or consider briefs or position papers that set forth the parties’ understandings of
the legal, factual, or scriptural issues.” Id. § 38.
128. Id. § 1.
129. E-mail from Peacemaker Ministries to author (Oct. 26, 2011) (on file
with author). In addition, Peacemaker Ministries conducts about 1,000
“coaching” calls each year, in which it attempts to help people find ways to
settle disputes on their own.
130. Id. The conciliators might carry out up to ten conciliations per year
each.
131. See Shippee, supra note 125, at 4–5.
132. Id.
133. Abdul Wahid Sheikh Osman, Islamic Arbitration Courts in America &
Canada? (2005), http://www.hiiraan.com/op/eng/2005/dec/Prof_Abdulwahid211
205.htm.
134. See Organizations and Affliations, BETH DIN OF AMERICA,
http://www.bethdin.org/organization-affiliations.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
135. The arbitration agreement for parties using Beth Din of America’s
services provides that “[t]he parties agree that the judgment may be entered on
the award in any court of competent jurisdiction in the State of New Jersey and
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Beth Din of America conducts about 400 “family” matters
each year—probate
matters,
divorces,
and status
determinations—and 100 commercial matters.136 Not all of
these commercial matters go to arbitration; however, some of
them would be heard in secular court, if not for the
availability of the Beth Din as an alternative forum.
There is no need here to reference all of the various
religious arbitration services available in the United States;
rather, it is enough to acknowledge their existence. Their
success, in large part, has been down to the willingness of
secular courts to enforce awards that they hand down. The
enforceability of these awards is dealt with in the next
subsection.
3. Enforceability of Awards of Religious Tribunals

04/16/2012 17:10:32

the State of New York.” Agreement to Arbitrate, BETH DIN OF AMERICA,
http://www.bethdin.org/docs/PDF3-Binding_Arbitration_Agreement.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 26, 2011).
136. Interview with Beth Din of America (Oct. 26, 2011) (notes on file with
author). Most of the family matters do not involve arbitration, although they
may have legal effect.
137. 141 F. App’x 263 (5th Cir. 2005).
138. Id. at 274.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 270.
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Various courts have considered the enforceability of
religious arbitration proceedings. In general, courts have
ruled that they are enforceable in civil courts. In Prescott v.
Northlake Christian School, the Fifth Circuit upheld a
Christian arbitration clause between an elementary school
and a teacher alleging discrimination and breach of
contract.137 The arbitrator granted damages to the teacher on
the grounds that the school had breached its contractual
commitment to “resolve all differences, including those not
submitted to arbitration, according to biblical principles.”138
The Fifth Circuit upheld the award even though damages on
such grounds would not have been available under any state’s
law.139
The court noted that the scope of the civil courts to
review the arbitration award was extremely limited.140 The
arbitration agreement was governed by Montanan law, which
was “substantially identical” to federal law when providing
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4. The “Religious Question” Problem and Challenge to
Arbitration
It is a tenet of American jurisprudence that civil courts
should attempt to avoid “religious questions,” which instead

04/16/2012 17:10:32

141. Id. at 271.
142. Id.
143. 680 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
144. No. 25099/05, 2008 WL 4155652, at *12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 8, 2008). A
married couple submitted their divorce to dispute to arbitration at a Beth Din.
Id. at *1. The arbitrator awarded child support that greatly exceeded what
could have been given under New York’s statute. Id. at *11–14.
145. The aim of preventing “entanglement” is “to prevent, as far as possible,
the intrusion of [Church or state] into the precincts of the other.” Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). As such, it forms one of the three prongs
of the “Lemon test.” See id. at 612–13.
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grounds for review.141 Accordingly, judicial review could only
be granted if the award was procured by corruption, fraud or
other means; if there was evident partiality on the part of a
neutral arbitrator; if any of the arbitrators showed evidence
of corruption or misconduct; or if the arbitrators exceeded
their powers.142 None of these grounds for review was
present.
Other cases involving religious arbitration have likewise
enforced the awards or the agreement to submit the dispute
to arbitration, on the grounds that arbitration is favored
under state and federal policy. In Abd Alla v. Mourrsi, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that an allegation of fraud
or corruption in an arbitration process would have to “clearly
demonstrate” that the award was tainted in order to
overcome the presumption in favor of the award.143 The
presumption in favor of the validity of a religious arbitral
award does not prevent a court from overturning it, however.
The New York Supreme Court noted in Berg v. Berg that an
arbitral award could be overturned on public policy grounds if
a provision of it violated a state statute or regulation.144 In
this regard, however, religious arbitral awards are simply
like secular arbitral awards.
Some courts have, however, considered a First
Amendment obstacle to enforcing arbitral awards: the
“religious question” doctrine, which aims to prevent
“entanglement” of church and state.145 This doctrine is
considered in the following subsection.
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146. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
147. Id. at 691.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 734.
150. Id. at 735. The Court upheld the hearing of the suit on the grounds that
the issue being litigated was different from that in the state courts, there was a
different named plaintiff, and different rights and remedies were being claimed.
Id. at 715.
151. Id. at 733. This was dictum, since the ruling did not rely on it.
152. 393 U.S. 440, 441 (1969).
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should be left to the competent religious authorities.
However, the definition of what is a “religious question” has
shifted over the years. In 1871, the Court decided Watson v.
Jones,146 which arose out of a dispute between a Presbyterian
congregation in Kentucky and the General Assembly of
the Presbyterian Church.
The General Assembly had
consistently supported the Union side in the civil war, and
expressed views “adverse to the institution of slavery.”147 In
1865 it decreed that any person who had aided the
Confederate side in the war should “repent and forsake
[his] sins” before he could be employed by the church.148 The
Presbytery of Louisville, Kentucky, denounced the decree of
the General Assembly, and the congregation of one of the
churches in its jurisdiction split over the issue. Each side of
the former congregation then claimed to be the owner of the
church. After conducting an “elaborate examination of the
principles of Presbyterian church government,” the Kentucky
Court of Appeals (the highest Kentucky court at that time)
ruled that the church belonged to the pro-slavery faction, and
thereby overruled the determination of the General Assembly
of the Presbyterian Church.149 The anti-slavery faction then
moved for an injunction in federal court, which was granted,
and affirmed by the Supreme Court.150 The Court noted that
the Kentucky Court of Appeals had erred in its ruling since it
had inquired into a matter “purely ecclesiastical in its
character.”151
The Court reiterated the need to avoid “religious
questions” in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Church. In this case, the Court heard an
appeal from the national Presbyterian Church against a
Georgia Supreme Court ruling that had given control of two
Presbyterian church buildings to local congregations.152 The
Georgia Supreme Court had ruled for the local churches on
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153. Id. at 443.
154. Id. at 449–50.
155. 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Colo. 1999).
156. Id. at 1106.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1107.
159. Id. at 1112. The plaintiff also challenged the validity of the arbitration
clause on the grounds that the contract containing the clause had been
superseded by another contract that lacked it. Id. at 1108.
160. Id. at 1112 (“ ‘ Neutral principles’ are secular legal rules whose
application to religious parties or disputes do not entail theological or religious
evaluations.” (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979)).
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the “departure from doctrine” theory. This stated that local
church property was held in trust for the benefit of a general
church “on the sole condition that the general church adhere
to its tenets of faith and practice existing at the time of
affiliation by the local churches.”153 The Court reversed,
holding that, because of the First Amendment, no court could
make the determination of doctrinal questions required in the
“departure from doctrine” theory.154
The religious question doctrine was considered in the
context of arbitration by a Colorado district court in Encore
Productions v. Promise Keepers.155 The plaintiff, Encore, was
a provider of meeting services, and the defendant was a
Christian organization that conducted “meetings and
conferences for men” in venues throughout the United
States.156 The contract between the parties stipulated that
“[a]ny claim or dispute arising from or related to this
Agreement shall be settled by mediation and, if necessary,
legally binding arbitration, in accordance with the Rules of
Procedure for Christian Conciliation of the Institute for
Christian Conciliation.”157 When the agreement between the
parties broke down, the plaintiff sued in district court for
breach of contract, and the defendant moved to dismiss, citing
the arbitration clause.158 In response, the plaintiff challenged
the validity of the contractual provision for Christian
arbitration services.159
The court rejected the plaintiff’s claims. It first noted the
religious question doctrine, but held that it could avoid
adjudicating religious matters by using “neutral principles,”
as laid down by the Court in Jones v. Wolf.160 These neutral
principles were “secular legal rules whose application to
religious parties or disputes do not entail theological or
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religious evaluations.”161 It then observed that it had only
“marginal review” over the decisions of religious arbitral
tribunals, citing Presbyterian Church.162 An agreement to
arbitrate, the court held, was a secular contractual matter—
and not a question of religious doctrine.163 Therefore, the
parties should arbitrate, and any problems arising out of the
arbitration could be reviewed in court later.164
The decision of the Encore court to dispatch the religious
question problem is consistent with that of other courts. In
Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals rejected the argument that
compelling religious arbitration before a Beth Din would
violate the religious question doctrine.165 Under the terms of
a Washington synagogue’s by-laws, a congregation member
could make a claim against the congregation as a whole to be
determined by a Beth Din.166 The congregation resisted
arbitration on the grounds that it would lead to a civil court
This
making determinations about religious matters.167
argument was rejected by the court, which said that it was
“fully satisfied that a civil court can resolve appellants’ action
to compel arbitration according to objective, well-established,
neutral principles of law.”168 The court distinguished between
the underlying dispute to be arbitrated—which was a
religious matter over which it did not have competence—from
the agreement to arbitrate itself.169
Courts have considered, and rejected, other challenges to
religious arbitration. In Encore, the plaintiff argued that the
use of religious arbitration would “violate their agents’ and
employees’ rights to the free exercise of their religion under
the First Amendment.”170 Encore did not claim that its own
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161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 869 A.2d 343 (D.C. 2005).
166. Id. at 346.
167. Id. at 353.
168. Id. at 354.
169. Id.
170. Encore Prod., Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1112 (D.
Colo. 1999).
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171. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (“The Court has
recognized that First Amendment protection extends to corporations.” (citations
omitted)).
172. 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1112.
173. Id.
174. No. 09-10-00010-CV, 2010 WL 3910366, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 7,
2010).
175. Id. at *5.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. No. 1:08-cv-1714-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 2750099 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009).
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First Amendment rights had been violated, though it might
have.171 Instead, it claimed that the arbitration agreement it
had executed was a legal nullity since it forced its employees
to take part “in proceedings of a religious nature.”172 The
court had little time for this argument. It noted that the
contract had been executed not by the corporation itself but
by employees on behalf of the corporation—and so the
corporation could not now claim that those employees were
being bound against their will. “The arbitration process . . .
contemplates participation by [employees].”173
Attacks based on the remedies that religious tribunals
may grant have fared little better. Woodlands Christian
Academy v. Weibust was the case of a teacher who took action
against her former employer, a school, for constructive
dismissal.174 The teacher argued that since the conciliation
provision in the arbitration clause stated, that “the
Holy Scriptures (the Bible) shall be the supreme
authority governing every aspect of the conciliation
process,”175 this constituted an “unconscionable limitation” on
the remedies that she should be able to obtain from the Texas
Commission on Human Rights.176 The appeals court rejected
this argument, noting first that the conciliation procedure (as
opposed to the arbitration procedure) was not binding, and
second that the arbitration agreement clearly stated that the
terms of any award were unenforceable if they conflicted with
state or federal law.177 The court therefore upheld the
enforceability of the arbitration provision.
A federal district court arrived at a similar result in
Easterly v. Heritage Christian Schools.178 The court rejected
the argument of the plaintiff, a former teacher, that
upholding a Christian conciliation provision would lead to a
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B. Canada
This section examines the status of religious arbitration
in Canada as a whole. Following the model of the previous
section, it examines first the framework for arbitration

04/16/2012 17:10:32

179. Id. at *3.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. No. 25099/05, 2008 WL 4155652, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 8, 2008).
183. Id. (citing Greenberg v. Greenberg, 656 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (App. Div.
1997); Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490, 494 (Sup. Ct. 1991)).
184. No. CV06-395-S-EJL, 2007 WL 2363372, at *5 (D. Idaho Aug. 16, 2007).
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).
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forfeiture of her “substantive rights.”179 Even though the
terms of the conciliation process stated that the Bible was to
be the “supreme authority” that would govern the
proceedings, it was sufficient that the terms also obliged the
conciliators to “take into consideration” secular law.180 The
plaintiff also failed to show how her procedural rights would
be impugned by the Christian provision.181 Therefore, the
court enforced the religious conciliation provision.
Courts have also been skeptical of arguments that claim
that religious arbitration has been forced on one party
through duress. In Berg v. Berg, a husband in a divorce case
claimed that he was forced to go to Jewish arbitration by his
wife since otherwise he would face a siruv, a finding of
contempt by his rabbi that would entail a “type of ostracism”
from the religious community.182 The court, citing precedent,
dismissed this claim.183 In Graves v. George Fox University, a
court dismissed a claim that a Christian arbitration
agreement between an employee, an admissions counselor at
a university, and his employer was procedurally
unconscionable.184 It stated that there had been no “stark
inequity” in bargaining power as the plaintiff had alleged,
and therefore upheld the arbitration agreement.185
American courts, so far as possible, treat challenges to
religious arbitration exactly as they would challenges to
secular arbitration—and exercise the same “presumption . . .
in favor of arbitration,” even in family law disputes.186 The
situation is somewhat more complex north of the border, as
will be shown in the next section.
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generally before addressing religious arbitration specifically.
As noted previously, family law arbitration in Ontario and
Québec forms an exception to the general principle in Canada
that religious arbitration should be enforceable, and will be
dealt with in the following section.
1. Framework of Arbitration in Canada
Until about twenty-five years ago, all arbitration in
Canada was based on English statutes that dated back to the
nineteenth century.187 The 1980s, however, saw a broad
movement to make Canada more attractive to business by
providing suitable fora for alternative dispute resolution.188
In 1985, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) promulgated the Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law).189 The
following year, Canada became a signatory to the New York
Convention,190 which requires courts in contracting countries
to give binding effect to private agreements to arbitrate and
enforce arbitration awards made in other contracting states.191 The enactment of this legislation required
provincial and federal coordination: while the New York
Convention binds states, the subject matter of commercial
arbitration is, under Canadian law, largely a provincial
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187. J. BRIAN CASEY & JANET MILLS, ARBITRATION LAW OF CANADA:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3 (2005).
188. See Randy A. Pepper, Why Arbitrate?: Ontario’s Recent Experience with
Commercial Arbitration, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 807, 808–11 (1998).
189. Id. at 811. The Model Law was adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1985. G.A. Res. 40/72, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/72 (Dec. 11, 1985).
190. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 6, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 (entered into force June 7, 1959). Canada
acceded to the Convention on May 12, 1986, and the Convention entered force
on August 10, 1986. See Status: 1958 – Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2011). Canada became the sixty-seventh signatory to the Convention,
behind San Marino, the Central African Republic and the Holy See. See id.
191. Article I provides that “[t]his Convention shall apply to the recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a state other than
the State where the recognition of such awards are sought . . . .” Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 190,
at 49. Article III provides that “[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize
arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of
procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon . . . .” Id.
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affair.192 As a result, each province, save Québec, enacted an
International Arbitration Act based on the UNCITRAL Model
Law.193
These International Arbitration Acts were applicable to
arbitrations that were “inherently commercial in nature and
‘international’ in scope.”194 They did not, therefore, cover
domestic disputes, although domestic parties could agree to
be bound by them.195 When the acts were passed, many
provinces felt the need to provide a domestic counterpart.196
The existing arbitration acts, based on the English
Arbitration Act of 1889, made no distinction between
domestic and international disputes, and the international
acts seemed inappropriate for various domestic disputes.197
Under the international acts, there were very few situations
in which a court could intervene, and there was no appeal to a
court unless it was already agreed in the arbitration
contract.198 While this might be suitable for sophisticated
international parties, it was generally considered less
appropriate for domestic parties.199 Many provinces therefore
decided to adopt domestic arbitration acts in the late eighties
and early nineties to govern these disputes.200
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192. See William C. Graham, International Commercial Arbitration: The
Developing Canadian Profile, in UNCITRAL ARBITRATION MODEL IN CANADA:
CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION LEGISLATION 93–99
(Robert K. Paterson & Bonita J. Thompson eds., 1987).
193. CASEY & MILLS, supra note 187, at 21. Québec’s arbitration provisions
are similar, and are found at Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, arts. 940–
951.2 (Can.).
194. CASEY & MILLS, supra note 187, at 21.
195. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Docs A/40/17 annex
1 & A/61/17 annex 1, 2 (2008), available at http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_EBOOK.pdf (“An arbitration is
international if . . . the parties have expressly agreed that the subject matter of
the arbitration dispute relates to more than one country.”).
196. CASEY & MILLS, supra note 187, at 23.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 21. New domestic arbitration acts were passed by Alberta, British
Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Ontario, Nova Scotia, Québec and
Saskatchewan. The remaining two provinces—Newfoundland and Labrador,
and Prince Edward Island—still use arbitration statutes based on the English
act of 1889.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 126 Side B

04/16/2012 17:10:32

4_WALTER FINAL.DOC

530

3/15/2012 4:16:34 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

04/16/2012 17:10:32

201. See Ontario v. Abilities Frontier Co-operative Homes Inc., 1996
CarswellOnt 2720, para. 27 (Can. Ont. C.J.) (WL).
202. International Arbitration Act, S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 48 (Can.).
203. Id. § 46.
204. 2008 CarswellOnt 5184, para. 3 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.) (WL).
205. Id. at para. 1.
206. Id. at paras. 33–34.
207. 2002 CarswellQue 729 (Can. C.S. Qué.) (WL).
208. Id. at para. 5.
209. Id.
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The passage of the international arbitration acts led to a
definite shift in favor of arbitration in Canada.201 Both
arbitration agreements and awards can only be reviewed by
courts in limited circumstances.
Under Ontario’s
International Arbitration Act, for example, an arbitration
agreement may be set aside if one party entered into the
agreement while under a legal incapacity, the agreement is
“invalid,” the subject matter of the dispute cannot be resolved
by arbitration under Ontario law, or the arbitration
Once an
agreement does not apply to the dispute.202
arbitration has taken place, a party appealing to overturn the
award may attempt to argue that the arbitration agreement
itself was defective, or may show fraud or a procedural
defect.203
Religious arbitration agreements are prima facie
enforceable in Canada. In Popack v. Lipszyc, for example,
two Ontario businessmen had agreed to submit a property
dispute to arbitration at a Beth Din, pursuant to the
International Arbitration Act.204 The plaintiff then brought
an action in civil court, arguing that the tribunal did not have
jurisdiction over the dispute and could not grant all of the
relief sought.205 The judge held that the burden was on the
plaintiff to prove that the arbitration could not be performed
by the Beth Din, and that he had failed to do so.206
In Grunbaum v. Grunbaum, a Québec court was asked to
enforce a judgment handed down by a Beth Din concerning
the use of an apartment in Jerusalem.207 The Beth Din had
given an initial judgment, but then, having heard new
evidence, announced that the judges were “resign[ing] from
the case and [did] not wish to continue presiding over this
case.”208 They urged the parties to go to “another rabbinical
court in another jurisdiction” to resolve the matter.209 The
Québec court refused to enforce this award, on the grounds
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that it was not a judgment susceptible of enforcement.210
However, the court acknowledged that, in theory, religious
arbitral awards could be enforced just like any other arbitral
awards.211
2. Challenges to Religious Arbitration in Canada
Canadian courts, like their American counterparts,
acknowledge a “religious question” doctrine—a desire to leave
religious matters to the religious authorities. As a leading
commentator has said, courts in Canada “will not consider
matters that are strictly spiritual or narrowly doctrinal in
nature.”212 The application of this principle can be seen in the
case of Reed v. Regina.213 In Reed, the plaintiff, a Jehovah’s
Witness, was aggrieved at the practice of the congregation to
which he belonged of holding disciplinary proceedings in
camera, and he asked the court to declare that holding these
proceedings in private violated the right to freedom of religion
that was enshrined in Canada’s Charter of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms.214 The court rejected the claim. It
noted that, on the contrary, to interfere in the affairs of the
religious tribunals of the Jehovah’s Witnesses would harm,
not protect, freedom of religion—and so the plaintiff’s claim
was not justiciable.215
However, courts will intervene to protect property,
contract or civil rights when the subject matter happens to be
religious in nature.216 In McCaw v. United Church of
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 127 Side A
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210. Id. at para. 14.
211. The court discussed the principles of homologation, the French term for
finalizing an arbitral decree before a court. It treated the award simply as a
sentence arbitrale. Id. at para. 10. It did not consider that it had any special
status by being a religious award.
212. M.H. OGILVIE, RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND THE LAW IN CANADA 218
(2d ed. 2003).
213. [1989] 3 F.C. 259 (Fed. Ct.) (Can.).
214. Id. at para. 2.
215. Id. at para. 10.
216. See, e.g., Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church v. Ukrainian Greek
Orthodox Cathedral of St. Mary the Protectress, [1940] S.C.R. 586, para. 591
(Can.) (“[I]t is well settled that, unless some property or civil right is affected
thereby, the civil courts of this country will not allow their process to be used for
the enforcement of a purely ecclesiastical decree or order.”). Civil courts can
enforce contract rights in addition to civil or property rights, if the contract
right is deemed sufficiently important. See, e.g., Lakeside Colony of Hutterian
Brethren v. Hofer, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 165 (Can.).
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217. [1991] 4 O.R. (3d) 481 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
218. Id. at para. 11.
219. Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren, 3 S.C.R. 165.
220. Id. at para. 3–4. Three other defendants had also been expelled, but,
being young persons who had not yet been baptized, they were not considered
members of the colony. Id. at para. 3.
221. Id. at para. 23.
222. [1989] 62 Man. R. (2d) 194, para. 28 (Can.).
223. 3 S.C.R. 165 at para. 81.
224. [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607 (Can.).
225. Id. at paras. 21–23.
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Canada, an Ontario court was asked to rule on whether a
pastor who had been sacked from his church had a valid
employment claim against the church.217 The crux of the
pastor’s claim was that the church had not adhered to the
“law of the church” as laid out in the church’s “manual.”218
Nevertheless, the court felt free to interpret the manual, and
thus hold that the church had acted wrongly in sacking the
pastor.
Another example of Canadian courts’ willingness to
intervene in religious disputes to protect parties’ civil or
property rights can be found in Lakeside Colony of Hutterian
Brethren v. Hofer.219 A Hutterite colony had expelled four
members of the colony, and attempted to obtain a court order
to enforce that expulsion.220 Because Hutterite colonies
practice communal ownership of property, expulsion
effectively stripped them of all their worldly goods.221 The
colony members resisted expulsion on the grounds that the
manner of the expulsion denied them “the right of natural
justice.”222 The Canadian Supreme Court, reversing the
decision of the lower courts, held that the colony members’
rights of “natural justice” had been denied since they were not
given the chance to defend themselves at the meeting at
which they were expelled.223
Cases involving requirements to appear before religious
tribunals are naturally rarer than religious question cases.
The leading case that deals with such a requirement is
Marcovitz v. Bruker, where the Canadian Supreme Court was
asked to rule on an agreement between two individuals to
appear before a Beth Din to obtain a get, a Jewish divorce.224
The plaintiff and defendant were observant Jews who had
been married for eleven years before beginning divorce
proceedings in 1980.225 Under the terms of the civil divorce
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226. Id. at paras. 23–24. Under Jewish law, a woman cannot obtain a get on
her own. Id. at para. 16.
227. Id. at para. 26.
228. Id.
229. Id. at para. 27.
230. Id. at para. 29.
231. Id.
232. Id. at para. 31 (quoting Marcovitz v. Bruker, [2003] R.J.Q. 1189, para.
19 (Qué. S.C.) (Can.)).
233. Id. at para. 31 (quoting Marcovitz, R.J.Q. 1189 at para. 30).
234. Id. at para. 33.
235. Marcovitz v. Bruker, [2005] R.J.Q. 2482 (Qué. C.A.) (Can.).
236. Id. at para. 76.
237. Id. at para. 77 (“[W]ho is this Court to tell [Marcovitz] that he had a civil
duty to perform irrespective of the rights he might have according to his
religious beliefs?”).
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agreement that they signed, the husband, Marcovitz, was
obliged to appear before a Beth Din to obtain the get.226
However, he refused.
After nine years of waiting, Bruker began proceedings in
Québec court for breach of the divorce agreement.227 She did
not sue to obtain the get, but for damages for breach of the
agreement, which had prevented her from entering into a new
religious marriage.228 Marcovitz demurred.229 Six years later,
however—and fifteen years after the civil divorce—he granted
Bruker the get.230 Bruker nevertheless continued in her claim
for damages.231 The trial court found that although the
granting or otherwise of the get was a religious matter, the
fact that the husband had agreed to grant the get as part of a
civil divorce contract “ ‘ moved [the case] into the realm of the
civil courts.’ ” 232 The judge stated that the “pith and essence”
of what was being demanded in the case was not religious,
and so the court could adjudicate the matter without
examining “principles of Jewish law . . . in depth.”233 The
court awarded Bruker CAD 47,500 in damages (rather than
the CAD 500,000 that she had sought).234
The court of appeals came to the opposite conclusion.235
For the appellate court, “the substance of the . . . obligation
[was] moral in nature, irrespective of the form in which the
obligation [was] stated.”236 The court held that if the plaintiff
was forced to pay damages for not granting the get, this would
interfere with his right to exercise his religion as he saw fit.237
The Canadian Supreme Court reversed. It held, over a
vigorous dissent, that failure to grant a get was a justiciable
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matter.238 The court considered that Marcovitz’s right of
freedom of religion had to be balanced with the harm that,
under Jewish law, was caused to his wife by his not granting
the get—in particular, the fact that she could not remarry
under Jewish law and her children would be illegitimate.239
The court looked to the legislative history of the federal
Divorce Act in making its judgment, and observed that the
Act specifically aimed to protect Jewish women.240
Marcovitz can be read as disposing of one principal
objection that may be made to religious arbitration—namely,
that agreements to appear before religious tribunals are not
justiciable in civil court. The court held that the agreement
to appear before the Beth Din was a secular contractual
matter that it was permitted to adjudicate.
However,
Marcovitz is less clear on whether forcing someone to attend a
religious tribunal would in fact be a violation of that person’s
rights. The court was only faced with the issue of damages:
the husband had already granted the get, and so there was no
question of attempting to enforce his agreement to appear
before the Beth Din. One commentator has surmised that an
attempt to force the husband to appear before the Beth Din
“would have likely been rendered by the Court as an
impermissible breach of the husband’s constitutionally
protected freedom of religion.”241
3. Family Arbitration in Ontario and Québec
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238. Marcovitz, 3 S.C.R. 607, paras. 39–47 (Can.).
239. Id. at para. 4.
240. Id. at para. 7.
241. Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from Religious
Arbitration in Family Law, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 573, 595 n.52 (2008).
242. This Article does not attempt to provide a detailed overview of every
Canadian province. However, for the sake of completeness, a brief overview of
the laws in British Columbia and Alberta, the next two provinces by size of
population after Ontario and Québec, is given here. These provinces do not
have laws that single out religious arbitration, or arbitration in family matters.
Religious arbitration is treated equally in British Columbia with all other types
of arbitration.
The Commercial Arbitration Act governs all domestic
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As noted above, the rules governing religious arbitration
of family matters in Ontario and Québec are different from
those governing arbitration of non-family matters in those
provinces, and also from the rules governing family
arbitration in other Canadian provinces.242
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Ontario’s Arbitration Act of 1991

Ontario responded to the need for new domestic
arbitration legislation with its Arbitration Act of 1991. The
Act made binding and enforceable all arbitrations within
Ontario, unless they were commercial disputes between
international parties, and thus preempted by the
International Commercial Arbitration Act, or they fell within
discrete areas of law that were outside the scope of
arbitration.243 Courts had more discretion to set aside awards
than they would under the New York Convention—for
example, they could intervene merely “to prevent unfair or
unequal treatment of parties”—but arbitration was still a
largely independent affair.244 The Arbitration Act provided
for binding domestic arbitration within the province with
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arbitrations. R.S.B.C. 2011, c.55 (Can.) (originally enacted as S.B.C. 1986, c.3
(Can.)). Despite its name, the Act states that it applies not only to arbitration
agreements in commercial settings, but also to “any other arbitration
agreement.” Id. § 2(1)(c). Courts may set aside an award in order to “prevent a
miscarriage of justice.” Id. § 31(2)(a). Unlike Québec and Ontario, there is no
statute that bars the use of arbitration in family contexts. However, the use of
arbitration in family disputes is extremely rare—possibly because there is
uncertainty as to whether non-commercial disputes can be covered in a
“commercial arbitration” act. See CATHERINE MORRIS, ARBITRATION OF FAMILY
LAW DISPUTES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 10–11 (Jul. 7, 2004), available at
http://www.bcjusticereview.org/working_groups/family_justice/paper_07_07_04.
pdf. A government review has proposed amending the law to bring family
disputes definitively within the scope of arbitration. MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL, WHITE PAPER ON FAMILY RELATIONS ACT REFORM 18 (July 2010),
available at http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/legislation/pdf/Family-Law-White-Paper
.pdf. However, British Columbia has seen little of the controversy over religious
arbitration that affected Ontario and to a lesser degree Québec. The status of
religious arbitration in Alberta is similar to that in British Columbia. The
Arbitration Act governs all arbitrations unless they are covered by the
International Commercial Arbitration Act, the arbitration is excluded by law, or
the parties exclude the application of the act. R.S.A. 2000, c. A-43, § 2(1) (Can.).
The exclusions by law cover areas such as labor relations and collective
bargaining—where provisions for arbitration are laid down in separate codes.
Id. at § 2(3). For the separate provisions for arbitration, see, for example,
Labour Relations Code, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-1, §§ 93–104 (Can.); Police Officers
Collective Bargaining Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-18, §§ 9–19 (Can.). Courts may, as
in British Columbia, overturn arbitral awards. However, review is very limited.
If parties have referred a question of law to the tribunal, this cannot be
reviewed by a court. R.S.A. 2000, c. A-43, § 44(3). Awards may also be reviewed
if one party has been treated “manifestly unfairly and unequally.” Id. § 45(1)(f).
However, there has been little or no controversy about religious arbitration in
Alberta, and it is sanctioned in all circumstances by law.
243. S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 2(1) (Can.).
244. S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 6 (Can.).
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245. Shelley McGill, Religious Tribunals and the Ontario Arbitration Act,
1991: The Catalyst for Change, 20 J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 53, 54 (2005).
246. R.S.O. 1980, c. 25 (Can.).
247. S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 32(1) (Can.) (“In deciding a dispute, an arbitral
tribunal shall apply the rules of law designated by the parties or, if none are
designated, the rules of law it considers appropriate in the circumstances.”).
248. Both Toronto and Ottawa have Batei Din. See Beth Din Orthodox,
Toronto,
JEWISH
IN
TORONTO,
http://www.jewishinto.com/Beth-DinOrthodox.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2011); Reb Arie, Courting Public Opinion,
TIKKUN DAILY (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.tikkun.org/tikkundaily/2009/08/14/
courting-public-opinion; see also Caryn Litt Wolfe, Faith-Based Arbitration:
Friend or Foe? An Evaluation of Religious Arbitration Systems and Their
Interaction with Secular Courts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 449 (2006) (noting
presence of Jewish and Christian arbitration services in Ontario prior to 1991).
249. See LOUIS M. EPSTEIN, THE JEWISH MARRIAGE CONTRACT: A STUDY IN
THE STATUS OF THE WOMAN IN JEWISH LAW 207–23 (photo. reprint 1973) (1927).
250. Id.
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“anyone as an arbitrator and any law as the criterion for
resolution.”245
Importantly, family law arbitrations fell within the scope
of the 1991 Act. Ontario’s pre-existing arbitration law had
not prevented this: private religious tribunals could give
binding judgments, so long as their judgments did not
contradict Canadian law.246 However, the requirement that
judgments conform to Canadian law was missing from the
Arbitration Act.247 For the first time, it seemed possible for
religious tribunals to make binding decisions in divorce and
inheritance cases that favored one party on grounds of sex,
seniority of birth, or other characteristics that would not be
judicially recognized under secular Canadian law.
For the first dozen years of the Act, there was no
controversy. Ontario’s Jewish community had Batei Din,
which operated for many years without attracting unwanted
attention.248 Prior to 1991, these had served their own
religious communities, handing down judgments based on
religious principles but without enjoying automatic state
enforcement. For example, the Halakhah (Jewish law) does
not lay down rules for the division of a couple’s assets in
divorce, instead allowing the divorce to take place according
to the terms of the ketubah (marriage contract).249 The
ketubah may simply state that the husband is to return the
dowry that the wife has brought to the marriage, and any
concomitant gifts.250 On the other hand, under Ontarian law,
a spouse in a divorce is entitled to half of the increase in
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value of the assets of the couple during the marriage.251
Similarly, Jewish inheritance law may frequently conflict
with secular Ontarian law. Under the Halakhah, if there are
both sons and daughters, the daughters will receive nothing
from an estate, except, under certain conditions, their
wedding expenses.252 However, if an individual dies intestate
in Ontario, his or her children inherit equally regardless
of sex;253 even in the case of testate succession, a party who
has been neglected can challenge a will.254
Before 1991, the possibility of Beth Din judgments that
violated these laws was not considered problematic since an
aggrieved party would always have recourse to the civil
courts. Post-1991, the Orthodox Jewish Beth Din of Toronto
responded to the change by asking the parties to any dispute
in family matters to sign an agreement that any award that
would be enforceable in court “must be made in accordance
with the civil requirements of Canada’s national and
provincial family legislation.”255 By voluntarily complying
with secular norms, the Toronto Beth Din succeeded in
averting a clash with civil courts.256
ii. The Controversy in Ontario over Religious
Arbitral Tribunals

04/16/2012 17:10:32

251. Family Law Act R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, § 5(1). “Equalization” of net family
properties is defined as the value of property owned by each party on the date of
divorce, minus the value of the property that that party owned on the date of
marriage. Id. § 4(1).
252. Benjamin C. Wolf, Note, Resolving the Conflict Between Jewish and
Secular Estate Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1171, 1176–77 (2009).
253. Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26, § 44.
254. Id. § 60.
255. Shachar, supra note 241, at 603.
256. Id.
257. Judy Van Rhijn, First Steps Taken for Islamic Arbitration Board
(Canada), LAW TIMES NEWS (Nov. 25, 2003, 1:37 PM), http://www.freerepublic
.com/focus/f-news/1028843/posts.
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The situation changed in 2003 when the Canadian
Society of Muslims founded the Islamic Institute of Civil
Justice to serve as a binding arbitration board for Muslims,
including in family disputes.257 Islamic family law contains
features that cannot be reconciled with Western civil justice
systems. Under Islamic law, a male inherits twice as much as
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a female.258 Since this is a Qur’anic injunction, and not a
legal ruling by scholars, it cannot be ignored.259 In divorce
cases, a man is bound to give his wife the amount of money
(mahr) agreed in the marriage contract; this amount may
sometimes be symbolic.260 Although these provisions have
elements in common with Jewish law, the possibility that
Islamic arbitration awards might be enforceable in secular
courts spooked the Ontario public and politicians and led to a
backlash.261
The following year, the Ontarian government asked the
former Ontario Attorney General Marion Boyd to review the
1991 Arbitration Act and religious tribunals operating
pursuant to it.262 Noting that “religious arbitration is already
being conducted by several different faiths,” she
recommended that arbitration be permitted to continue,
subject to certain safeguards.263 These safeguards included
greater judicial review: a court would be permitted to set
aside an arbitral award on grounds of unconscionability if it
did not adequately protect the rights of children or if it had
infringed rights to “fair and equal treatment.”264
Furthermore, parties to arbitration would have to sign an
agreement before the arbitration stating that they were
aware under what law the arbitration was being conducted,
and that they were aware it was voluntary.265
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258. Qur’an 4:12 (“Allah commands you regarding your children: a male shall
have as much as the share of two females.” (2 THE HOLY QUR’AN 501, Hazrat
Mirza Tahir Ahmad trans., Islam Int’l Publications 1988)).
259. Id. (“This fixing of portions is from Allah.”).
260. RAFFIA ARSHAD, ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 133 (2010).
261. The relatively swift increase in the Muslim population of Ontario in the
1990s may have contributed to a greater sensitivity among Ontarians about
making Islamic law binding. In 1991, almost 146,000 Ontarians identified as
Muslims; by 2001, this had more than doubled to about 353,000, 3% of the
population. Canada Census: Major Religious Denominations, Ontario, 1991 and
2001, http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/Products/Analytic/companion/
rel/tables/provs/onmajor.cfm (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). On the other hand, the
numbers of Christians and Jews increased slightly, but in line with general
population growth, remaining at around 80% and 2% of the population
respectively. Id.
262. MARION BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING
CHOICE, PROMOTING INCLUSION 1 (2004), available at http://www.attorney
general.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/executivesummary.pdf.
263. Id. at 3.
264. Id. at 4–5.
265. Id. at 4.
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These protections did not satisfy the critics of the
provision.266 The political pressure led to Ontario Premier
Dalton McGuinty announcing in September 2005 that all
religious arbitration would be banned.267 He announced in
uncompromising language: “There will be no shariah law in
Ontario. There will be no religious arbitration in Ontario.
There will be one law for all Ontarians.”268 The Family Law
Amendment Act, enacted in 2006, defined “family arbitration”
as being “conducted exclusively in accordance with the law of
Ontario or of another Canadian jurisdiction.”269
iii. The Rationale for the Prohibition of Arbitration
in Family Disputes in Ontario

04/16/2012 17:10:32

266. See Religious Law in Canada; Catholics and Mission, THE
RELIGION REPORT (Sept. 21, 2005), http://www.abc.net.au/radionational
/programs/religionreport/religious-law-in-canadacatholics-and-mission/3364436.
267. Ontario Will Ban Shariah Arbitrations, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2005),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9904E4DB1031F931A2575AC0
A9639C8B63.
268. Id.
269. S.O. 1991, c. 1, § 1(1) (Can.).
270. See, e.g., Sharia Move in Canada Draws Anger, BBC NEWS (Sept. 8,
2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4226758.stm.
271. Press Release, Muslim Canadian Congress, MCC Welcomes Government
Bill to End Religious Arbitration (Nov. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.muslimcanadiancongress.org/20051115.pdf.
272. Natasha Bakht, Family Arbitration Using Sharia Law: Examining
Ontario’s Arbitration Act and Its Impact on Women, 1 MUSLIM WORLD J. HUM.
RTS. 1, 2 (2004).
273. Press Release, Canadian Council of Muslim Women, Initial Response to
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The decision to ban religious tribunals in Ontario was
taken in response to political pressure that resulted in
demonstrations outside Canadian embassies and consulates
in cities around the world.270 Both women’s and Muslim
groups objected to the existence of binding religious
arbitration. For example, the Muslim Canadian Congress
argued that the religious arbitration law would permit
“religious clerics . . . to turn back the clock and use the
judicial system to enforce their waning authority over
vulnerable communities.”271 The Canadian Council of Muslim
Women commissioned a study on the issue272 and castigated
Marion Boyd for overlooking the “impending negative impact
on vulnerable women and children of government-sanctioned
The
establishment of ‘Sharia’ tribunals in Ontario.”273
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Canadian Federation of University Women said that making
religious arbitration binding would lead to a “two-tier system
of law that [would] discriminate against women, particularly
minority and immigrant women.”274 The National Association
of Women and the Law claimed that “most religions can be
interpreted as endorsing male domination and female
inferiority” and so the government sanction of “religious
decision-making as part of the legal order would very often
condone the commission or the perpetuation of potential
discriminations.”275 A total of fifty-three organizations put
their names to a declaration stating that the Boyd Report
would “sanction the erosion of women’s equality rights under
the laws of Ontario.”276
The exact reason for the decision to back away from
religious tribunals in Ontario is unclear.277 Dalton McGuinty,
Ontario’s premier, spoke of the use of religious law in binding
arbitration as “threaten[ing] our common ground.”278 The
overwhelming pressure for the ban came from “wellorganized, politically savvy women’s groups . . . who framed
the issue in terms of women’s equality rights being violated
by a multiculturalism gone mad.”279 One commentator has
described the decision as being informed by “the prospect of
tension, if not a direct clash, between religious and secular
norms governing the family—and the fear that women’s hardwon equal rights would be the main casualties of such a
showdown.”280
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 131 Side B
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Marion Boyd’s Report on the Arbitration Act (Dec. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.ccmw.com/press/press_room_2004.html.
274. ONTARIO COUNCIL OF CANADIAN FEDERATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN,
COMMENTS ON THE BOYD REVIEW AND THE ARBITRATION ACT 3 (2005), available
at http://www.cfuwontcouncil.ca/Reports/boyd.pdf.
275. Andrée Côté, An Open Letter Opposing the Use of Arbitration and
Faith-Based Tribunals in Family Law in Ontario, 23 JURISFEMME 3 (Feb. 24,
2005), available at http://www.nawl.ca/en/newlibrarypage/jurisfemme/64jfvolume232005/230-an-open-letter-opposing-the-use-of-arbitration-a-faithbased-tribunals-in-family-law-in-ontario.
276. Declaration on Religious Arbitration in Family Law, YWCA CANADA,
http://ywcacanada.ca/data/publications/00000019.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
277. Harvey Simmons, One Law for All Ontarians, TORONTO STAR, Sep. 14,
2010, at A21.
278. Sharia Law Move Quashed in Canada, BBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4236762.stm.
279. Simmons, supra note 277, at A1.
280. Shachar, supra note 241, at 584.
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iv. Religious Arbitration in Québec
The status of religious arbitration in Québec is similar to
that in Ontario: it may not be used for “family” disputes, but
is otherwise permitted. Québec’s arbitration laws are
embedded in the Québec civil code.287 The code explicitly
provides that “[d]isputes over the status and capacity of
See Bakht, supra note 272.
Charter, supra note 2, § 15(1).
Id. § 28.
Bakht, supra note 272, at 20.
See Côté, supra note 275.
Id.
Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c.64, arts. 2638–2643.
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Legal analysis largely focused on those provisions of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom that could be used
to protect women’s rights.281 Section 15(1) of the Charter
states that “[e]very individual is equal before and under the
law and has the right to the equal protection and equal
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on . . . sex.”282 Section 28
emphasizes the commitment to sex equality, providing that
“all the freedoms referred to in [the Charter] are guaranteed
equally to male and female persons.”283 These provisions
could be used in a challenge arguing that “the lack of limits in
the Arbitration Act permitting family law matters to be
arbitrated upon using an alternative legal framework to
Ontario’s family law regime is discriminatory because of its
adverse impact on women.”284
A second legal argument against binding religious
arbitration focused not on the risk of sex discrimination, but
on freedom of religion, the topic of this Article. The argument
suggested that religious arbitration might be inconsistent
with freedom of religion, since it could infringe “individual
liberty and subjective choice in the interpretation of religious
norms.”285 Since each person has the right to interpret a
religious precept as he or she chooses, giving a religious order
legal effect “could force an individual to act contrary to her
belief.”286 A legal challenge to the Arbitration Act never
materialized, however, and arguments based on religious
freedom were secondary to arguments focused on equality
and women’s rights.
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persons, family matters or other matters of public order may
not be submitted to arbitration.”288 That did not stop the
Assemblée Nationale of Québec from unanimously adopting a
motion in 2005 that there should be no religious arbitration
in family matters in Québec—and in the rest of Canada for
good measure.289 The proponent of the motion, Fatima
Houda-Pepin, cited Article 15 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, and asserted bluntly: “Les victims de la
charia ont un visage humain, et ce sont les femmes
musulmanes.”290
However, there is no provision that states that religious
arbitration may not be used for commercial matters. In fact,
Québec gives great deference to arbitral awards. Domestic
arbitral awards can only be overturned in court for the same
reasons as international awards—namely, certain procedural
defaults.291 A court is not permitted to enquire into the
merits of the case. Therefore, religious arbitration in Québec
is entirely possible and is treated equally with non-religious
arbitration.
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION

04/16/2012 17:10:32

288. Id. at art. 2639.
289. MICHEL VENNE, L’ANNUAIRE DU QUEBEC 2006 at 212–13 (2007).
290. Id. at 214 (“The victims of Sharia have a human face, and are Muslim
women.”).
291. CASEY & MILLS, supra note 187, at 30.
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This Part discusses arguments that may be made against
religious arbitration. It first considers the arguments that
have traditionally been made against religious arbitration.
These are the lack of substantive protections for certain
parties, particularly women, and the lack of procedural
protections (for example, the dangers of arbitral bias). It
shows why these arguments are not legally sufficient to
undermine the status of religious arbitration in either the
United States or Canada. It then suggests a stronger
argument against religious arbitration, based on the
constitutional right—in both the United States and Canada—
to the free exercise of religion. It argues that religious
arbitration has the effect of limiting freedom of religion, and
therefore it should be used only when the dispute has a
religious subject matter that civil courts are not equipped to
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handle.
A. Traditional Arguments Against Religious Arbitration
1. United States
The arguments that are made against religious
arbitration concerning women’s rights are inherently
attractive. As noted in Part II.C, religious codes frequently
contain provisions that discriminate against females.
Furthermore, the composition of religious tribunals
themselves is problematic. Under Jewish law, for example,
women cannot serve as judges.292 The same generally applies
to Islamic tribunals.293 Under American law, of course, sexual
discrimination in the selection of judges is forbidden—and
juries must contain a “fair cross-section” of society.294 Hence,
these might appear to be two reasons why binding religious
arbitration risks being unlawful.
However, neither reason is sufficient to make religious
arbitration generally unconstitutional. In the United States,
religious arbitration is only enforceable in court if it does not
conflict with secular law. The Supreme Court recently
restated the principle that “a substantive waiver of federal
civil rights will not be upheld” in an arbitration agreement.295
However, courts are reluctant to interfere with arbitration on
procedural grounds alone.296 If one party believes that there
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 133 Side A
04/16/2012 17:10:32

292. QUINT, supra note 81, at 52 (noting, however, that a woman can be a
judge if the litigants have asked her to be).
293. See, e.g., MAI YAMANI, FEMINISM AND ISLAM: LEGAL AND LITERARY
PERSPECTIVES 211 (1996) (reporting Speaker of Iranian Parliament saying that
judges must be male). But see Ilene R. Prusher, New Female Judge Transforms
SCIENCE
MONITOR
(May
13,
2009),
Islamic
Court,
CHRISTIAN
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0513/p06s20-wome.html
(describing appointment of first two female judges to Islamic court in West
Bank); Vaudine England, Malaysian Groups Welcome First Islamic Women
Judges, BBC NEWS (July 9, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10567857
(describing appointment of first female judges to Islamic courts in Malaysia).
294. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975). Taylor held that a state
law that provided that women could only serve as jurors if they had opted in to
the jury pool was unconstitutional. Id. at 530–31.
295. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009). In Easterly v.
Heritage Christian Schools, the judge noted that the correct remedy for a waiver
of rights was after the arbitration act had taken place, not before. No. 1:08-cv1714-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 2750099, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009).
296. See, e.g., Penn v. Ryan’s Family of Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753, 758
(7th Cir. 2001) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly counseled that the FAA
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is a procedural defect in the arbitration that has weakened its
rights, the party needs to clearly demonstrate this in order to
obtain relief. Courts do not like “speculating” about the
Nor do they entertain
potential procedural defects.297
presumptions that an arbitral panel will be biased.298 As
noted earlier, the consistent policy of courts has been to
construe arbitration provisions “liberally.”299 Therefore, the
arguments advanced by the opponents of religious arbitration
are legally inadequate in the United States. Awards that
clash with “public policy” or show “manifest disregard for the
law,” as noted above, will not be enforced—but this is not
sufficient legally to ban religious arbitration ex ante.
2. Canada

04/16/2012 17:10:32

leaves no room for judicial hostility to arbitration proceedings and that courts
should not presume, absent concrete proof to the contrary, that arbitration
systems will be unfair or biased.”).
297. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000).
298. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (“ ‘ [W]e
decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body
conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent,
conscientious and impartial arbitrators.’ ” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985))).
299. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 627.
300. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570, para. 76 (Can.).
301. Martin v. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Comp. Bd.), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, paras.
35–37 (Can.).
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This subsection will deal first with substantive
protections for arbitration in Canada generally, and will then
focus on specific substantive protections that apply to family
law in Ontario.
Under Canadian law, arbitration proceedings that violate
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms may be
appealed in a civil court. In the early 1990s, the Canadian
Supreme Court established the proposition that arbitral
tribunals had a duty to abide by, and interpret, the Charter.
In Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Ass’n v. Douglas College, the
court held that “there cannot be a Constitution for arbitrators
and another for the courts.”300 The court has more recently
held that any arbitral tribunal that is competent to interpret
law is obligated to consider the Charter.301 Lower provincial
courts have followed suit in interpreting the Charter in
considering arbitration awards. In 2004, an Ontario trial
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Ontario Nurses’ Ass’n v. Mount Sinai Hosp., [2004] 69 O.R. (3d) 267.
Id. at para. 20.
S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 6(a).
Id. § 3.
Id. § 19.
2001 CarswellOnt 452, paras. 75, 99 (Can. Ont. S. Ct J.) (WL).
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court quashed a ruling of an arbitral tribunal that had denied
severance payment to a hospital employee who left her work
after a long period of sick leave.302 The court cited Subsection
15(1) of the Charter, which prohibits discrimination on
grounds of disability.303
Given this, there seems little reason to be concerned that
religious arbitration in Canada would lead to grave injustices:
awards that seem unconstitutional can be appealed in a civil
court. These protections apply both to family and non-family
arbitration, as will be discussed now with reference to the
case of Ontario. A core feature of Ontario’s 1991 Arbitration
Act, as noted above, is that it was possible for the parties to
choose religious law for binding non-commercial arbitration.
However, the argument of the opponents of the law—that this
would lead to outcomes that were unjust—was not wellfounded.
Under Section 6(a) of the Act, courts were permitted to
intervene “to prevent unequal or unfair treatment of parties
to arbitration agreements.”304 Section 6(a) was waivable,
according to Section 3, which concerned the rights of parties
to opt out of agreements.305 Parties were permitted to exclude
almost all of the “default” provisions of the Arbitration Act.
However, Section 3 specifically barred parties from excluding
from their arbitration contract Section 19 of the Act—which
states that “[i]n an arbitration, the parties shall be treated
equally and fairly.”306
This provision was not a dead letter. In 2001, the Ontario
Superior Court held in Hercus v. Hercus that the notion of
equality and fairness was not limited to “procedural fairness,”
and that a case should be remanded for trial when the
arbitrator appeared biased to one party.307 In Hercus, a
divorced couple had agreed to undertake binding arbitration
to resolve issues of custody and access rights to their two
children. The court considered that the arbitrator had
favored the father of the children by concealing information
from the mother, and so breached her rights under Section 19
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Id. at paras. 128–42.
Id. at para. 76.
Id.
2000 CarswellOnt 1462 (Can.) (WL).
Id. at paras. 39–40.
Id. at para. 28.

04/16/2012 17:10:32

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 134 Side B

of the Act.308
In addition, the Hercus court suggested that a further
reason to overturn an apparently binding award might be
that it involved family law. The court noted the deference
that should be given to arbitration agreements, but then
observed that the Act “governs all kinds of disputes, typically
but not exclusively, commercial. Its terms about enforcing
arbitration clauses and awards are not framed particularly
for family law and still less are they drawn for custody and
access matters.”309 The court then stated that, in custody
matters, it would permit itself to overturn a binding award to
serve “the best interests of a child.”310
Hercus relied in part on Duguay v. Thompson-Duguay,
another Ontario case, where a judge overturned an
arbitration award between a divorced couple that was the
result of unjust arbitration proceedings.311 The couple had, as
in Hercus, entered arbitration to resolve access rights to their
children—although the mother had not signed the arbitration
agreement, and had entered the process unwillingly.312
Duguay did not rely on Section 19 of the Arbitration Act,
although the court noted its counterpart, Section 6, which
gives a court the right to intervene “to prevent unfair or
unequal treatment of parties.”313
Duguay and Hercus together show that Ontario courts
were prepared to use their inherent parens patriae power,
and the powers given to them under the Arbitration Act, to
enjoin “unfair and unequal” treatment and prevent unjust
outcomes to minors in the arbitration process. It is unlikely
that this power would not have been extended to cover women
generally if, as planned, Islamic arbitration tribunals had
been set up and rendered judgments that were considered
biased towards men.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that there would have been
any procedural defects based on the sole use of male
arbitrators that would have rendered the judgments
unenforceable. The Canadian Supreme Court has held that
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the perception of bias is sufficient to invalidate the choice of
an arbitrator.314 However, no Canadian case has dealt with
bias simply on account of an arbitrator’s sex—and any
presumptive challenge to an arbitrator simply on account of
his sex would be extremely difficult.315 Furthermore, as noted
above, binding religious arbitration had been practiced
successfully for twelve years by Batei Din before the outcry
over Islamic arbitration, and no complaints about procedural
defects had been made.
B. Freedom of Religion and the Enforceability of Religious
Arbitration in the United States and Canada
This section considers a new argument against the
enforceability of religious arbitration: that it infringes the
free exercise rights of those who are bound by religious
arbitration agreements or awards. The following sections set
out the problems, from a free exercise perspective, with
applying religious substantive or procedural law to resolving
disputes.
1. United States
i.

The First Amendment Right to Freedom of
Religion

04/16/2012 17:10:32

314. Newfoundland Tel. Co. v. Newfoundland, [1992] 1. S.C.R. 623, para. 23
(Can.).
315. Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms prohibits discrimination on
grounds of sex. Charter, supra note 2, §§ 15(1), 28.
316. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
317. DAVID O. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 4 (2d
ed. 2009).
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The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion].”316 As stated above, the
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause has evolved over
the years, and there is no reason to believe that it will not
continue to do so.317 However, one definite marker can be laid
down: no person may be obliged to believe in any faith, or not
to believe in any faith. This point was made most famously in
the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments of James Madison: “The Religion then of every
man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every
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man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these
may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable
right.”318 These words have been cited on numerous occasions
by the Supreme Court.319
There are, generally speaking, few rights that are truly
“inalienable.” The right to have a nationality is a plausible
contender.320 The right to vote is a right that may not be sold,
but which the state can alienate.321 The Declaration of
Independence names “Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
Happiness” as inalienable rights—but courts have the power
to infringe these rights.322 However, Madison was at pains to
explain why the right to religion was inalienable. It was
inalienable both because “the opinions of men, depending only
on the evidence contemplated by their own minds, cannot
follow the dictates of other men;” and because it is the “duty
of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 135 Side B
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318. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 48, 50 (John J. Patrick & Gerald P. Long eds., 1999).
319. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 n.38 (1985) (striking down
Alabama statute authorizing period of silence in public schools for meditation or
prayer); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 705 & App. II (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (upholding property tax exemption for religious properties); Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947) (prohibiting use of public funds to pay
for transport of children to Catholic schools); id. at 37 & App. (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
320. In Perez v. Brownell, Chief Justice Warren wrote that “[c]itizenship is
man’s basic right, for it is nothing less than the right to have rights.” 356 U.S.
44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Warren’s views did not carry the day,
and it was ruled that the petitioner could be stripped of his U.S. citizenship. Id.
at 62. However, he was not rendered stateless, since he also had Mexican
citizenship. Id. at 46. The majority was therefore not troubled by the fact that
he could be left without any nationality, and it was only Chief Justice Warren’s
dissent that was concerned with the question of statelessness in general. Id. at
64.
321. As of March 2010, forty-nine states denied the right to vote to
incarcerated felons; thirty-five states, to paroled felons; thirty states, to felons
on probation; and two states, to all felons. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Mar. 2011), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_bs_fdlawsinusMar11.pdf.
Felon disfranchisement laws have been upheld as constitutional, provided that
they do not have a discriminatory motive and impact. See Hunter v.
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
322. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“The Declaration of Independence . . . is not a legal prescription conferring
powers upon the courts.”).
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only, as he believes to be acceptable to him.”323 No American
court has ever suggested that any person might be coerced
into believing in a faith in which he or she does not wish to
believe.
The right to believe, or not to believe, in any religion has
a necessary corollary: the right to change one’s beliefs. It is
this right that is endangered in court enforcement of religious
arbitration orders.
ii. The Right to Change Religious Beliefs and
Enforceable Religious Arbitration
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323. Madison, supra note 318.
324. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1635 (2005).
325. Id. at 1655–56.
326. See, e.g., RONALD L. EISENBERG, THE JPS GUIDE TO JEWISH TRADITIONS
568 (2004) (describing how Batei Din in Israel exercise “complete jurisdiction
over the Jewish population” in personal matters).
327. See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in
American Family Law, 63 MD. L. REV. 540, 579–83 (2004) (describing use of
ketubot among Jewish communities).
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American courts have consistently upheld the
enforceability of religious arbitration agreements if the
agreements were entered into voluntarily.324 On account of
state and federal policies favoring arbitration, the burden on
proving lack of voluntariness is on the part of the person
seeking to exit the agreement.325 Courts do not look for such
evidence themselves. Therefore, a court would not seek proof
that someone who had agreed to enter into Christian
arbitration, was, in fact, a Christian. In any case, such an
inquiry—determining the status of a party’s religion—would
likely contravene the religious question doctrine.
Many religious arbitrations are predicated on the
assumption that the parties are, however, of a certain faith.
For example, a Beth Din will only sit in judgment between
two Jewish parties.326 A ketubah stating that any divorce will
be arbitrated by a rabbinical court necessarily presupposes
that the parties are Jewish.327
No court, however, has considered an obvious question:
what if a party was happy to agree a religious arbitration
contract, but then wishes to change religion before the
contract is arbitrated? This is not an extreme hypothetical.
Cases of parties attempting to overturn an arbitration ruling
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328. 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Colo. 1999).
329. Id. at 1112–13.
330. For a discussion of Biblical principles in conflict resolution, see KEN
SANDE, THE PEACEMAKER: A BIBLICAL GUIDE TO RESOLVING PERSONAL
CONFLICT (2004).
331. See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 945 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding
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because of religious differences with the arbitrators have
come before the courts. One such case, Encore Productions v.
Promise Keepers, was noted earlier.328 The Encore court held
that “[a]lthough it may not be proper for a district court to
refer civil issues to a religious tribunal in the first instance, if
the parties agree to do so, it is proper for a district court to
enforce their contract.”329 The court took the view that the
agreement to undergo religious arbitration was a question of
civil contract law, so a court could enforce it.
Encore is troublesome. There was no underlying religious
issue that a court could not adjudicate—for example, an issue
that would pose a “religious question.” The dispute was a
purely commercial one relating to the termination of a
contract. Nevertheless, the court held, following established
doctrine, that voluntary consent to take a dispute to
arbitration was all that mattered. In effect, the court held
that a party could alienate its rights to religious freedom, by
having a religious procedural law imposed on it through
arbitration.
Encore was wrongly decided. Religious arbitration of
non-religious issues should not be binding on parties through
the civil courts, because it risks infringing their right to
religious freedom. The problematic nature of this kind of
issue can be brought out by another example. Suppose that
an individual signing an employment contract with a
Christian school agrees to Christian dispute resolution in the
case of conflict. This contract may contain a clause obliging
her, before moving to binding arbitration, to attempt a
conciliation session according to Biblical principles.330 In
order to take part in the conciliation, the party will need to
act in a “Christian” fashion. Her religious rights have been
alienated by the contract.
Of course, it is possible for religion to form an element of
a contract. The same teacher may, under the terms of her
contract, agree that she will remain a member of a church, for
example.331 However, in such a case the teacher has not
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contract under which “[t]eacher recognizes the religious nature of the Catholic
School and agrees that Employer has the right to dismiss a teacher for serious
public immorality, public scandal, or public rejection of the official teachings,
doctrine or laws of the Roman Catholic Church.”); see also Prescott v. Northlake
Christian Sch., 141 F. App’x 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2005) (describing school
employment contract in which teacher promises to “attend and financially
support a local church with fundamental beliefs that are in agreement with the
doctrinal statement of [the school]”).
332. One potential response is that the teacher might preserve her right to
religious freedom by simply acceding to the school’s demands in the religious
arbitration, and thereby avoiding an appearance before the religious tribunal.
However, this course of action would automatically lead to a financial penalty (a
default judgment against her). Leaving her job, on the other hand, would not
lead to such a penalty, because she would have the option of finding other
employment.
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alienated her right to religious freedom. She may always
choose to cease teaching at the same time as stopping going to
church. Suppose, however, that she ceased to go to church
and the school then began proceedings against her for breach
of contract. If the school then compelled her to go to religious
arbitration, this would constitute a denial of religious
freedom, and her right to religious freedom would have been
alienated.332 If the school took action before a secular
tribunal, however, there would be no alienation of the right to
religious freedom. The teacher had exercised her free right to
change religion; it merely happened that her employment
contract was conditional on her not doing so.
The risk of alienation of religious rights is most clear in
cases where one participant openly wishes to change religion.
However, it can also be seen in cases where no party
expresses a wish to change religion. This is because religious
arbitrations have a deterrent effect on people changing
faith—and this deterrence works a form of alienation. Take,
for example, an employee who works at a Christian school,
and who has a Christian arbitration clause in her
employment contract. When she signed the contract, she selfidentified as a Christian. The employee may now have a
grievance against the school and wish to have this grievance
adjudicated. At the same time, she no longer wishes to
identify as Christian, and would like to take steps that
symbolize that she is no longer a Christian—for example,
ceasing to attend her church. However, because she knows
that she will have to take her dispute with the school to a
Christian dispute resolution panel, she is reluctant to do so.
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333. See infra Part IV.D concerning an immediate agreement to arbitrate.
334. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, When Religious Practices Become Legal
Obligations: Extending the Foreign Compulsion Defense, 23 J.L. & RELIGION
535 (2008); Helfand, supra note 104, at 1274 (“[M]any minority groups are
becoming decreasingly concerned with their integration into civil society and
increasingly concerned with securing their own law-like autonomy.”).
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Her free exercise of religion has been constrained by the
religious arbitration contract.
This argument applies with the same force to the
enforcement of religious arbitration awards as it does to the
enforcement of arbitration proceedings. Even if a party to a
religious arbitration contract, after a dispute has arisen,
consents to go to arbitration, there is an inevitable delay
between this consent and the actual arbitration proceedings.
It is during this period of delay that free exercise rights are
again endangered. Therefore, religious arbitral awards from
proceedings that parties have consented to should be as
unenforceable as the actual proceedings.333
Some scholars have argued that religious arbitration
increases religious freedom by providing a measure of “group
autonomy”: persons of the same religion are able to group
together to adjudicate their disputes according to the laws of
their community.334 It is easy to appreciate the benefits of
such procedures that give rise to cohesion within a
community. It is less clear, however, that such procedures
should be binding when they govern purely secular disputes
that would be justiciable in a civil court. First, as noted
above, these procedures have consequences for religious
freedom, even if no party to the arbitration contract objects to
the arbitration or the award. Second, if one person attempts
to avoid enforcement of the arbitration agreement or the
award, and does not comply with them voluntarily, the
community cohesion that the procedure is attempting to
promote may already be lacking—and it is far from obvious
that the state should step in to create it.
On the other hand, agreements to arbitrate disputes that
would not be justiciable in a civil court should be binding, as
should be the awards therefrom. This argument is made in
the next subsection.
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iii. Religious Arbitration on Religious Matters

04/16/2012 17:10:32

335. Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional
Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 274 (2008).
336. 593 A.2d 725 (N.J. 1991).
337. Id. at 731.
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Religious arbitration on matters that involve “religious
questions” should be binding in civil court. As discussed
above in Parts II.A.4 and II.B.2, these questions cannot be
solved in a civil court. If religious arbitration were not
binding, these questions would have no possible judicial
resolution.
For example, a church might employ a priest on condition
that he followed certain doctrine. If a dispute arose as to
whether he had followed the doctrine, no court would be able
to resolve it, since it would be a quintessential religious
question. The only way in which it could be settled would be
for a religious tribunal to adjudicate it.
A court should then enforce the judgment of the tribunal,
subject to the “public policy” and “disregard for the law”
doctrines described above. The alternative is clear: otherwise
any such contract would be unenforceable, which would make
it extremely difficult to run a church. (Presumably, priests
would need to be employed on an at-will basis, and would
only be able to have very limited contractual rights—which
could make them almost impossible to find.) In this case, the
restraint on religious freedom imposed by making the
religious arbitration contract enforceable is outweighed by
the gains to religious freedom by making it possible to run the
church. As one scholar has noted, “religious freedom . . .
Religious arbitration on
requires an infrastructure.”335
religious matters is a component of this infrastructure, in a
way that religious arbitration on secular matters is not.
Religious arbitration proceedings were found binding for
much this reason in the case of Elmora Hebrew Center v.
Fishman.336 In Fishman, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
enforced a religious award made by a Beth Din against a
synagogue. The court disregarded the argument made by the
synagogue that it did not recognize the religious authority of
the Beth Din, and that to enforce the award would violate its
free exercise rights.337 The court warned that a trial court
could not send civil issues to a religious authority for
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adjudication; but it endorsed sending religious issues to the
same.338 This was a correct decision; otherwise, no resolution
of the dispute would have been possible.
2. Canada
The arguments for making religious arbitration
unenforceable in Canada are similar to those that justify
making religious arbitration unenforceable in the United
States. Canadians’ rights to the free exercise of religion are
arguably even more sweeping than Americans’. Furthermore,
Canadians also have an absolute right to change religion.
Therefore, religious arbitration on secular matters should be
unenforceable.
i.

The Right of Free Exercise of Religion Under the
Canadian Constitution

04/16/2012 17:10:32

338. Id. at 732.
339. Charter, supra note 2, § 2 (providing that “[e]veryone has . . . freedom of
conscience and belief.”).
340. Id.
341. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.). Freedom of religion had previously been
treated as part of the “federal legislative competence.” Id. at para. 3.
342. Id. at para. 5.
343. Id. at para. 94.
344. Id. at para. 95.
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The right of free exercise of religion is guaranteed by
Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
enacted in 1982.339 This defines four “fundamental freedoms,”
first among which is “freedom of conscience and religion.”340
The Canadian Supreme Court considered the meaning of
freedom of religion under the Charter for the first time in
Regina v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. in 1985.341 At issue was
Alberta’s “Lord’s Day Act,” which prohibited trading on a
Sunday.342 The court ruled that the Act infringed Canadians’
right to freedom of religion. The court defined freedom of
religion as “the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a
person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly
and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to
manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by
teaching and dissemination.”343 This freedom, said the court,
could “primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion
or restraint.”344 The Canadian Supreme Court held that the
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Lord’s Day Act worked a “form of coercion” by “bind[ing] all to
a sectarian Christian ideal.345
The Big M Drug Mart decision was particularly striking
since it adopted a broader conception of religious freedom
than that found in American jurisprudence. The Canadian
Supreme Court specifically noted that the U.S. Supreme
Court had, four times, upheld Sunday closing laws on the
grounds that they now had a secular purpose and effect.346
The Canadian court observed that its U.S. counterpart had
found that although the Sunday closing laws had a “clear
origin in the religiously coercive statutes of Stuart England,”
they had since evolved to become “purely secular labour
legislation.”347 The Big M Drug Mart court, however, refused
to find that Alberta’s Sunday closing law had a “secular
purpose,” and denied an attempt by the appellants to argue
that even if there was a religious purpose to the litigation, it
had a secular effect.348
ii. The Right to Change Religion Under the
Canadian Constitution

04/16/2012 17:10:32

345. Id. at para. 97.
346. Id. at para. 89. The Canadian Supreme Court cited McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961);
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961);
and Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
347. Big M Drug Mart, 1 S.C.R. 295 at para. 74.
348. Id. The Big M Drug Mart ruling was also notable for its discussion of
the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. The Canadian Supreme Court
observed that the U.S. Supreme Court had noted that Sunday closing laws in
America were a “potential violation of the ‘anti-establishment’ principle.” Id. at
para. 106. Yet the Canadian court rejected the appellants’ contention that the
absence of an Establishment Clause in the Canadian Charter should be
considered evidence in favor of the constitutionality of the Sunday closing laws.
Id. at para. 108. The unconstitutionality of the Lord’s Day Act, rather,
depended on Section Two of the Charter alone. Id.
349. [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (Can.).
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As noted above, the right freely to exercise religion
necessarily implies the right to change religion. This right
has been explicitly noticed in Canadian law. In Syndicat
Northcrest v. Amselem, the Canadian Supreme Court
was asked to rule whether an Orthodox Jew had the right
to build a sukkah on the balcony of his apartment in
Québec.349 A clause in Amselem’s condominium contract

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 139 Side B

04/16/2012 17:10:32

4_WALTER FINAL.DOC

556

3/15/2012 4:16:34 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

04/16/2012 17:10:32

350. Id. at para. 9.
351. Id. at para. 29.
352. Id. at para. 111 (Bastarache J, dissenting).
353. Id. at para. 64.
354. Id. at para. 46 (“[O]ur Court’s past decisions and the basic principles
underlying freedom of religion support the view that freedom of religion consists
of the freedom to undertake practices and harbour beliefs, having a nexus with
religion, in which an individual demonstrates he or she sincerely believes or is
sincerely undertaking in order to connect with the divine or as a function of his
or her spiritual faith . . . .”).
355. Id. at para. 66.
356. Id. at paras. 43–46 (citing Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829
(1989); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); R. v.
Videoflicks, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (Can.); R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 (Can.)).
357. Id. at para. 71.
358. Id.
359. Id.
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banned exterior “constructions of any kind whatsoever.”350
The court noted the argument, accepted by the trial court,
that the ban on constructions on balconies was “neutral”: it
affected all constructions on balconies equally.351 Other items
that the housing association had requested removed from
balconies included emphatically secular satellite dishes and
trellis.352 However, it held that the neutrality of the rule at
issue did not matter in a case where rights to freedom of
religion were “significantly impaired.”353 What mattered to
the court was that the appellants (of whom Amselem was the
named party) had a sincere religious belief that they should
build sukkot.354 Once the court had established the sincerity
of this belief, it was wrong to go further and attempt to decide
whether this sincere belief was theologically correct, which
the trial court had done.355 Instead the court cited both
Canadian and American decisions that stand for the
proposition that courts should be deferential to personal
views of religious obligation.356
In order to determine “sincerity” of belief, the trial judge
had taken account of whether the appellants had built sukkot
in the past.357 As a result of this, he determined that some of
them had a “sincere” belief, but others did not. The Canadian
Supreme Court rejected this approach. It held that a court
could not “conclude that a person’s current religious belief is
not sincere simply because he or she previously celebrated a
religious holiday differently.”358 It expressly noted: “Beliefs
and observances evolve and change over time.”359 The court
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made clear that it would not place a party under a disability
because of a change of beliefs; all that was necessary was that
the change should be sincere.
iii. Religious Arbitration of Secular Issues Under the
Canadian Constitution

Id. at para. 29.
494 U.S. 872, 879 n.3 (1990). See infra note 396 and accompanying text.
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
Amselem, 2 S.C.R. 551, at para. 184 (Binnie J, dissenting).
Id. at para. 185.
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360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
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The above discussion shows that all the same protections
for freedom of religion—and the right to change religion—
exist under Canadian law as under American law. A fortiori,
the same basic arguments apply as to why religious
arbitration of non-religious issues should be unenforceable
under Canadian law.
However, the Canadian constitutional right to freedom of
religion is even stronger than its American counterpart.
Notably, the Canadian Supreme Court in Amselem rejected
two arguments, discussed in more detail below, why religious
arbitration might be held enforceable in the United States.
First, the court specifically rejected the argument that the
housing association’s rule against exterior construction was
simply a “neutral” regulation that affected all apartment
owners equally.360 In the United States, under Employment
Division v. Smith, such a regulation might well be held
constitutional on the grounds that it was a “neutral law of
general applicability.”361
Second, the court also rejected the argument that
contracts are inherently secular matters that cannot be
overturned for religious reasons, as American courts have
held.362 The dissent in Amselem argued that the case should
be decided on grounds of contract rights. Justice Binnie
stressed the weight he placed on “the private contract
voluntarily made among the parties to govern their mutual
The appellants, he noted,
rights and obligations.”363
“undertook by contract to the owners of this building to abide
by the rules of this building,” and therefore should not be
permitted to build their sukkah.364 The Canadian Supreme
Court, in rejecting this reasoning, held that freedom of

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 140 Side B

04/16/2012 17:10:32

4_WALTER FINAL.DOC

558

3/15/2012 4:16:34 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

religion trumps freedom of contract. In doing so, they
implicitly rejected the reasoning of American courts that have
forced parties to accept religious arbitration against their
will.
iv. Religious Arbitration of Religious Issues

Marcovitz v. Bruker, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607 (Can.).
See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
Marcovitz, 3 S.C.R. 607 at paras. 93–95.
Id. at paras. 7–8.
Id. at paras. 134–53.
Id. at para. 7.
Id. at paras. 94–100.
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As in America, however, religious arbitration should be
enforceable when it concerns religious issues that cannot be
resolved by a civil court. When a party can only resolve a
dispute by appearing before a religious tribunal, and refuses
to do so despite his prior agreement, a civil court should be
able to penalize him for this. This is illustrated well by the
precedent of Marcovitz v. Bruker,365 the Canadian Supreme
Court case discussed above.366
In Marcovitz, the court signaled its desire to help Jewish
women obtain religious divorces by punishing a husband for
the breach of his contractual duty to grant a religious divorce
from a Beth Din.367 The court specifically noted that Canada’s
Divorce Act had been amended simply to make it possible to
oblige men to grant gittin from Batei Din.368 It compared the
Canadian law with that of other jurisdictions, and noted that
New York had amended its divorce law so that the party
instigating the divorce had to certify that there were no
barriers to the remarriage of either party, and so that judges
could take account of any barriers when dividing up assets.369
The court also noted how Jewish women—unlike Jewish men,
and unlike Christian women, Muslim women or women of
other faiths—alone suffered from a peculiar disability in
depending on their husbands to obtain a religiously valid
divorce.370
Marcovitz was decided correctly. By granting damages,
the Canadian Supreme Court signaled its willingness to
enforce a contractual agreement to appear before a Beth
Din.371 The religious nature of the get is such that only a Beth
Din can grant it; a civil body is entirely powerless in this
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area. The court observed the case involved a clash of rights:
“the claim to religious protection is balanced against
competing interests.”372 On the one hand was husband’s right
to exercise his religion as he saw fit; on the other hand was
the wife’s right to be free to remarry according to the laws of
her religion. The Québec Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms in fact mandates a balancing between fundamental
rights, such as the free exercise of religion, and a regard for
The court found for the wife,
“democratic values.”373
although, as previously noted, it was not faced with the
question of whether it should force the husband to appear at
the Beth Din.
The principle of Marcovitz can be extended to any
instance where a dispute can only be settled by religious
authorities: in such cases, it is freedom-enhancing, not
freedom-limiting, to enforce religious arbitral awards and
agreements.374 The next Part considers responses to the
argument put forward in this Part.
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF RELIGIOUS
ARBITRATION
The argument above is novel, and open to counterarguments. Four potential responses will be dealt with in
this Part.
A. Freedom of Contract
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372. Id. at para. 20.
373. Id. at para. 15. The court considered the Québec Charter in greater
depth than the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
374. See Garnett, supra note 335.
375. See, e.g., Helfand, supra note 104, at 1241.
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One response to the argument in Part III is that, under
the doctrine of freedom of contract, parties should have the
right to enter into any contract they choose—including one
that contains a religious arbitration clause.375 In such a
contract, it is easy to discern the tension between freedom of
contract and freedom of religion. Under principles of freedom
of contract, the contract should be enforceable. Under
principles of freedom of religion, it should not, since it
restricts one’s choice of religion later.
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This distinction can be termed one of ex ante and ex post
liberty. Ex ante liberty is a liberty where a subject is “free to
be forced”: she can enter into contracts that in some way
Ex post liberty is a
constrain her rights later.376
“Rousseauian” liberty: the subject is “forced to be free,” and
cannot enter into contracts that later constrain her rights.377
Ex ante and ex post liberty are necessarily in tension with
each other. Economists defend ex ante liberty, even in areas
that are removed from traditional areas of economic focus,
such as marriage.378
To prevent parties from entering into religious
arbitration contracts is a restriction of ex ante liberty.
However, courts have frequently upheld restrictions on ex
ante liberty. In the United States, for example, employees
can only waive their right to sue under the Age
Discrimination Employment Act in limited circumstances.379
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal
proceedings can only be waived in a “knowing and voluntary”
manner.380 Courts strike down contracts that harm a person’s
ability to make a living or practice a trade.381 Canadian
courts in Canada also restrict ex ante liberty in various
circumstances.382
Courts scrutinize contracts that involve waivers of rights
for evidence of substantive or procedural unconscionability.383
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376. F. H. Buckley, Introduction to The FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 1, 17 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999).
377. Id.
378. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as a Relational
Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998) (defending Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage
Act, under which parties who agree to have a “covenant marriage” must wait for
two years if they wish to obtain a no-fault divorce). John Witte and Joel Nichols
have explored the use of binding religious law in marriage contracts. See John
Witte Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, Faith-Based Family Law in Western Democracies?,
in FIDES ET LIBERTAS 122 (2010), available at http://www.irla.org
/assets/files/Fides/Fides2010.pdf.
379. See Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 426 (1998).
380. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2086 (2009).
381. See, e.g., Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 240 N.W. 2d 710
(Mich. 1976).
382. See, e.g., R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383, para. 26 (Can.) (holding
that waiver of right to counsel in trial “must be premised on a true appreciation
of the consequences of giving up the right”); Bryant v. R., [1984] 6 O.A.C. 118
(Can. Ont. C.A.) (holding that waiver of jury trial is valid only if it is made with
a full understanding of what is involved).
383. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability in
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However, some rights cannot be waived at all; or they can be
waived very easily. The right to vote is one such right: some
economists have suggested that the right should be sellable,
although this is of course illegal.384 There is, at the same
time, no right to sell oneself into slavery—as various
philosophers have noted.385 The right to freedom of speech, on
the other hand, can be waived very easily: it is regularly
waived by millions of Americans each day who, while at work,
agree not to engage in activities that are unrelated to their
employment.386
The right to freedom of religion falls in the former
category. Two arguments can be made in support of this
contention. The first has historical roots: in the eighteenth
century, as noted above, Jefferson argued that the right of
religious freedom was “inalienable.” This was not a uniquely
American sentiment: in the United Kingdom at the same
time, Richard Price wrote that “no people can lawfully
surrender their religious liberty by giving up their right of
judging for themselves in religion, or by allowing any human
beings to prescribe to them what faith they shall embrace.”387
The second argument is more modern, and is founded in
discrimination doctrine. Religion, like race and sex, has come
to be considered as a protected category in Western
jurisprudence.388 This is because it has long been a source of
discrimination in society;389 protections against religious
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 142 Side A
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the Securities Industry, 78 B.U. L. REV. 255 (1988).
384. See Ryan Hagen, Is it Smarter to Sell Your Vote or to Cast it?,
FREAKONOMICS (Nov. 16, 2007), http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/
2007/11/16/is-it-smarter-to-sell-your-vote-or-to-cast-it/.
385. See, e.g., Andrew Sneddon, What’s Wrong with Selling Yourself into
Slavery? Paternalism and Deep Autonomy, 33 CRÍTICA: REVISTA
HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFÍA 97 (2001).
386. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517–18
(Mass. 1892) (“There are few employments for hire in which the servant does
not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free speech, as well as of
idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as
he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him.” (Holmes, J.)).
387. RICHARD PRICE AND THE ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION: SELECTIONS FROM HIS PAMPHLETS 78–79 (Bernard Peach ed.,
1979).
388. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)
(prohibiting employment discrimination on grounds of “race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin”).
389. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Religion and Race Under the Constitution:
Similarities and Differences, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 491–92 (1994) (“Perhaps
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discrimination, just like sexual and racial discrimination, are
built into modern constitutions and codes. It is very hard for
a person to enter into a contract that discriminates against
another party on grounds of race or sex: except in certain
circumstances, such a contract would be unenforceable.390
By the same token, it should not be possible for a person
to enter into a contract that could lead to discrimination
against another party on grounds of religion.
Binding
religious arbitration contracts have this potentially
discriminatory effect.
A person who is bound by the
procedural law of a certain religion against his will may not
be able to participate fully in the arbitral proceedings and
may thus suffer discrimination. Therefore—unless there is
no other way in which the dispute may be settled, as in
“religious question” cases—these proceedings should not be
enforceable at law.391
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the strongest justification for strict judicial scrutiny of any official attempt to
accord persons less than equal respect and dignity either because of their
religious beliefs or race rests in the fact that throughout history such efforts
have been similarly rooted in hate, prejudice, vengeance, and hostility.”
(citation omitted)).
390. To enter into a contract that apparently discriminates on grounds of a
protected category such as race or sex, an employer must be able to show that
the characteristic sought is a “bona fide occupational quality.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(e)(1) (2006). Courts do not permit such discrimination easily. See, e.g.,
Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) (“The BFOQ
defense is written narrowly, and this Court has read it narrowly.”). In the
seminal case of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court held that a
racially discriminatory contract could not be enforced against the target of the
discrimination; this holding was extended in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953), to prevent enforcement of a racially discriminatory agreement to the
detriment of a party who was not the target of the discrimination.
391. Probate cases are an interesting example of when courts have upheld
legal provisions that apparently infringe on individuals’ religious freedom. In
Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 234 (Mass. 1955), the Massachusetts
Supreme Court upheld a provision of a will that stripped the inheritance rights
of a beneficiary who married outside the Jewish faith. However, cases such as
these are distinguishable from the arbitration cases discussed in this Article. In
the case of testamentary restrictions, the right of the beneficiary to receive a
gift is subject to that person behaving in a certain (religious) way. In the
examples of religious arbitration that this Article considers problematic, the
litigants are not attempting to obtain a gift, but to vindicate their contractual
rights. See supra note 331 and accompanying text (discussing religious
enforcement of secular employment contracts).
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B. Freedom of Religion
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392. See, e.g., Zohra Moosa, Balancing Women’s Rights with Freedom of
Religion: The Case Against Parallel Legal Systems for Muslim Women in the
UK, in STATE OF THE WORLD’S MINORITIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 2010, at
42 (2010).
393. See supra note 335.
394. See RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (Paul A. Marshall ed., 2008).
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Another response to the argument that enforceable
religious arbitration clauses infringe freedom of religion is
that such clauses are in fact a manifestation of freedom of
religion.392 Under this argument, the right to enter into such
agreements is a form of religious freedom, which
courts should uphold. However, this argument reflects a
misconception of religious arbitration and of religious
freedom.
First, under the argument above, parties who wish to
enter into religious arbitration on secular matters are still
entirely free to do so. While it would likely constitute an
infringement of religious freedom to shut down a center or
institution that operated such services, it does not constitute
an infringement of religious freedom to refuse to honor an
agreement or award in court. The parties to such a religious
arbitration contract are still perfectly free to abide by the
terms of the contract themselves. If the parties do not wish
voluntarily to abide by the terms, this may in fact be a sign
that the benefits to religious freedom from promoting this
agreement are relatively limited.393
Second, religious freedom is not construed as the ability
to have secular courts recognize religious arbitration
agreements or awards on secular matters. For example, the
Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom ranks
countries by their religious freedom, on a scale of 1 to 7.394
The rankings are based on the results of checklists sent to
experts in each country. While the checklists contained a host
of different variables, from the predictable (for example, “Do
citizens have the right to change religion or belief?” to the
complex (for example, “Do communities of believers, different
groups within religions, atheistic groups, and institutions
enjoy the same rights in access to various public methods of
social communication?”), not one of them implicates the right
to have religious agreements or rulings honored in secular
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Similarly, a report sponsored by the Pew
courts.395
Charitable Trust lists various factors that are implicated in
religious freedom, “including the right not to have personal
religious beliefs eroded by the requirements of religious law
or custom”—but it contains no reference to whether religious
judgments should be enforceable in secular courts.396 While
there are, as noted above, “infrastructural” benefits to
binding religious arbitration on religious matters, as noted
above, these benefits are not secured by enforcing religious
tribunals’ judgments on purely secular disputes.
C. Discrimination Against Religion

04/16/2012 17:10:32

395. Id. at 451–76. The only mention of the court system is a question “Do
believers of different religions, different groups within religions, and atheists
enjoy the same rights . . . before the courts?” Id. at 464.
396. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A WORLD REPORT 8 (Kevin Boyle &
Juliet Sheen eds., 1997); see also Audrey Macklin, Performing Citizenship:
Encultured Women’s Articulation of Claims in the Public Sphere, in
MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP, BORDERS AND GENDER 285 (Seyla
Benhabib & Judith Resnik eds., 2009) (noting that the Ontario legislation
making religious arbitration unenforceable in civil courts was “probably secure
from the complaint that it discriminates against religious law,” since it “denie[d]
recognition to all legal orders external to Canadian law.”).
397. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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A related response to that in Part IV.B above is that
refusal to honor religious judgments in secular court
constitutes discrimination against religion. This is, on its
face, a plausible argument. If two parties can contract to
arbitrate their dispute according to the laws of another
jurisdiction, it might seem that there is no reason why they
should not be able to contract to use the laws of a religion.
American and Canadian courts have both considered
laws that ostensibly discriminate not against one particular
religion, but against all religions. In the United States, the
Court has noted that “the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes (or proscribes).’ ” 397 The case, Employment
Division v. Smith, involved two individuals who had ingested
peyote, a psychoactive drug, as part of a religious ceremony,
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398. Id. at 874.
399. Id. at 875.
400. Id. at 879–80 (citing Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878)).
401. Id. at 885–89.
402. See id. at 890 (stating that it is the responsibility of the legislature to
determine what laws may infringe freedom of religion).
403. See, e.g., Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161–65.
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and were fired.398 The possession of peyote was a crime in
Oregon, and the intent to use the drug for religious purposes
was not accepted as an affirmative defense by the Oregon
courts.399 The Court noted that the law banning peyote
possession was a typical anti-narcotic statute that had an
apparently secular purpose, and compared it with laws
obliging shops to close on Sunday, statutes banning
polygamy, and a regulation compelling the Amish to pay
social security taxes contrary to their religious belief.400
It seems clear, following Smith, that a prohibition
against judicial recognition of arbitral agreements or awards
would not violate the U.S. Constitution, since it would be a
neutral law that would affect all religions equally. However,
this argument has an inevitable rejoinder. If it is “neutral”
(and hence constitutional) to prohibit judicial recognition of
religious arbitral agreements and awards, it is surely equally
“neutral” to permit judicial recognition of such agreements
and awards. Furthermore, the Smith Court rejected any
heightened level of judicial scrutiny for rules that
may infringe freedom of religion.401 Therefore, even though
religious arbitration may restrict freedom of religion, the
state should still have the right to enforce religious arbitral
agreements and awards.402
This argument is probably the strongest that can be
made in defense of religious arbitration, but is still
rebuttable. There is a fundamental difference between the
right to have a court enforce a religious arbitration agreement
or award, and the regulations cited as “neutral” in Smith. All
of the regulations cited as “neutral” in Smith affect how an
individual may practice his or her religion. For example, the
injunction against polygamy prevents a person for whom
polygamy is a religious tenet from practicing this aspect of his
religion.403 However, it does not deter an individual from
exercising her right to change religion: it does not force a
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person to appear before a religious tribunal and participate in
religiously based arbitral proceedings.
Furthermore, the Smith Court also reaffirmed the core
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, as described above.
Justice Scalia wrote “[t]he free exercise of religion means,
first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever
religious doctrine one desires . . . . The government may not
compel affirmation of religious belief . . . .”404 As this Article
has argued, forcing a party to go to religious arbitration when
it is unnecessary to do so runs directly counter to “the right
. . . to profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”
Therefore, a defense of the enforceability of religious
arbitration based on Smith cannot be successful.
Canadian courts do not have a doctrine of neutrality such
as that followed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith.
However, there is a firm policy that public institutions are
permitted to bar their doors to religion, so long as they do so
in an even-handed fashion. In Bal v. Ontario, parents sought
permission to establish alternative “opt-in” religious schools
within Ontario’s secular school system.405 Such religious
schools had been permitted while Ontario had a Christian
public school system, but following the secularization of the
system (which itself was the result of court cases), “opt-in”
schools had been banned.406 The court held that the law
prohibiting such schools did not violate freedom of religion:407

Canadian courts have in fact been criticized for
“jump[ing] to the conclusion that the Charter mandates a
secular society in which public institutions must be free from
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404. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
405. [1994] 21 O.R. 3d 681 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.), aff’d, Bal v. Ontario, [1997]
101 O.A.C. 219 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
406. Id. at para. 10.
407. Id. at para. 118.
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The public school system is secular, it does not present the
opportunity for education in any particular denomination
or faith. The objective is to provide non-denominational
education. Should parents desire that their children have
a religious education they must assume the cost. This
does not mean that there is adverse effect discrimination.
The government prohibition is just, fair and
constitutional.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 145 Side A

04/16/2012 17:10:32

4_WALTER FINAL.DOC

2012]

3/15/2012 4:16:34 PM

RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION

567

any religious taint.”408 Other commentators have noted that
the courts simply seek to “ensure that all individuals are . . .
treated by the state with equal respect, whatever their
religious beliefs and practices.”409 Regardless of how the
position of the courts is characterized, it seems clear that
“neutral” laws affecting the exercise of religion do not infringe
constitutional rights in Canada.
Therefore, it would not be unconstitutional to bar courts
from recognizing religious arbitral awards and agreements.
However, as in the case of the discussion of American law, the
reverse question is appropriate: is it constitutional to permit
religious arbitral awards to be enforced simply because all
religion is treated in an equal manner? The answer is “no.”
Unlike its American counterpart, the Canadian Supreme
Court has not held that laws of neutral application affecting
religious belief are constitutional, per Employment Division
v. Smith.410 Therefore, it is not possible to advance a
“neutrality” argument simply to justify the judicial
recognition of religious arbitral awards and agreements.411
D. An Immediate Agreement to Arbitrate
If it is accepted that a religious arbitration agreement
cannot be enforced because it infringes an individual’s right
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408. David M. Brown, Freedom from or Freedom for?: Religion as a Case
Study in Defining the Content of Charter Rights, 33 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV.
551 (2000).
409. Richard Moon, Liberty, Neutrality and Inclusion: Religious Freedom
Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 563,
564 (2003).
410. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Employment Division v. Smith has never been cited
with approval by the Canadian Supreme Court. It was referred to by the
dissent in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, para. 189 (Can.)
(Binnie J, dissenting).
411. Rather, the Canadian Supreme Court, when examining facially neutral
laws to determine whether they infringe freedom of religion, investigates
whether they adversely affect a particular subgroup. In Multani v. MargueriteBourgeoys, for example, the Canadian Supreme Court was asked to consider the
constitutionality of a school rule that prevented a Sikh boy from carrying a
ceremonial dagger, or kirpan, to school. [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (Can.). The
majority noted that there is a “duty to make reasonable accommodation for
individuals who are adversely affected by a policy or rule that is neutral on its
face.” Id. at para. 53. In the case of arbitration, individuals who cannot enforce
religious arbitral awards or agreements in a secular court are not “adversely
affected” by the inability to do so—since they have the option of litigating the
matter, if necessary, in a civil court.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 145 Side B

04/16/2012 17:10:32

4_WALTER FINAL.DOC

568

3/15/2012 4:16:34 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that religious arbitration on
secular matters should be non-binding in both the United
States and Canada. Americans’ free exercise rights are

04/16/2012 17:10:32

412. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
413. Courts do, of course, set down apparently arbitrary temporal lines to use
as judicial rules. In the United States, the most famous example may be the
trimester framework for abortion laid down in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–
65 (1973). Such lines are, of course, easily open to attack. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992)
(overturning the trimester framework of Roe, and noting that “[a]ny judicial act
of line-drawing may seem somewhat arbitrary”).
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to change religion, a final objection is possible. Why should
courts refuse to honor an arbitral award when the arbitration
is carried immediately? Two parties could agree to take a
dispute to religious arbitration, and have it settled on the
spot, before either party had the time to consider changing
religion. In such cases, there would seem to be little risk of
infringement of free exercise rights.412
However, there is a difficulty with a secular court’s
enforcement of a religious arbitration award in such a
situation: it is impossible for a court to determine whether a
religious arbitration has taken place quickly enough to justify
the enforcement of the award. An immediate resolution by a
religious tribunal would seem acceptable. However, the
question is more complex if the mediation started
immediately, and lasted several days, or even weeks. There
would in that case be a period of time in which someone
might reconsider his or her beliefs, and wish to exit the
process. Similarly, the situation would be more complicated if
the dispute resolution process started two days after the
parties agreed to submit their dispute to a religious arbiter.
A court would need to decide on a bright-line that would be
completely arbitrary—and unworkable.
It would be
impossible for a court to hold that if a dispute was resolved
within x days of agreeing to submit to religious arbitration,
the award could be enforced in secular court, but not if it was
resolved within x + 1 days. Therefore, the only solution for
the courts is to refuse to enforce religious arbitration awards
on secular matters, regardless of when the arbitral agreement
was signed.413
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414. For the debate that has taken place in the United Kingdom, see,
for example, Riazat Butt, Archbishop Backs Sharia Law for British Muslims,
(London),
Feb.
7,
2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/
GUARDIAN
uk/2008/feb/07/religion.world; Afua Hirsch, Dozens of Sharia Courts Are Giving
Illegal Advice, Claims Civitas Report, GUARDIAN (London), June 29, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jun/29/sharia-courts-illegal-advice-claims.
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jeopardized by the current practice in the United States. In
Ontario, the government took the right decision to make
religious arbitration non-binding in matters of family law in
2006. However, other forms of religious arbitration on nonreligious matters remain binding, and these should also
become non-binding, both in Ontario and the rest of Canada.
Legislators should be sure to stress that religious
arbitration remains a favored mode of dispute resolution. An
act making religious arbitral agreements or awards
unenforceable would face far less resistance if it was at the
same time recognized that such tribunals can play a valuable
role in society. Parties should still feel free to settle their
disputes out of the court system, just as now. An act that
renders religious arbitration awards and agreements
unenforceable should not be interpreted as an attack on
religious arbitration per se. With care, legislators will be
arrive at a result that preserves the constitutional right to
freedom of religion but is not perceived as being an attack on
a religious communities.
A further implication of the argument in this Article is
that religious arbitration on secular matters may be
constitutionally suspect in many jurisdictions outside North
America. Even though the United States and Canada have
different jurisprudence on the free exercise of religion,
enforceable religious arbitration can be seen to be problematic
in both countries. It therefore does not seem unreasonable to
surmise that the arguments in this Article may also be
extended to other countries: this is an interesting hypothesis,
and one that is worthy of research, given that other Western
nations, such as the United Kingdom, have also had vocal
debates about the status of religious arbitration within their
borders.414 This Article thus provides grounds for challenging
the status of religious arbitration in North America, and
furthers the discussion over the status of religious arbitration
elsewhere in the world.

